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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
AN EXPLORATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL BUYING BEHAVIOR IN THE 
PUBLIC SECTOR 
 
This dissertation begins with a comprehensive examination of the current state of research 
regarding organizational buying behavior. Through this review we identify a significant 
gap in our existing knowledge regarding organizational buying behavior in the public 
sector. Due to the high level of impact that government purchasing has on the economy, 
and the nuances that differentiate public from private sector purchasing practices, I further 
explore organizational buying behavior in the public sector to make the following 
contributions. 
 
First, I highlight the common practice in business-to-government (B2G) and business-to-
business (B2B) transactions where buyers limit suppliers’ access to them during the buying 
process. This research terms these buyers “barricaded buyers.” Despite their prominence 
in practice, research related to barricaded buyers remains virtually non-existent. Therefore, 
the present research draws on insights gleaned from eight case studies over a period of 
approximately eighteen months to shed light on this important topic.  
 
Second, this dissertation advances a conceptual framework highlighting competitive 
actions a focal supplier can take to improve its selection likelihood when selling to 
barricaded buyers. The framework identifies novel ways suppliers can gain advantage by 
reducing competitive intensity in the pre-barricade phase (e.g., by peacocking) and by 
enhancing their RFP response quality in the post-barricade phase (e.g., by offering 
consummate solutions). Importantly, the framework invokes the notion of strategic 
information disclosure whereby a focal supplier may gain advantage by knowing when to 
convey what types of information in barricaded buying environments. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In 2010, B2B (business-to-business) transactions accounted for over $10 trillion in the 
United States (Grewal et al. 2015). Despite the financial magnitude, less than five articles 
per year have been devoted to B2B in the top four marketing journals in the last decade 
(Lilien 2016). One area of B2B research in much need of attention is organizational buying 
behavior (OBB). “Many of the foundational models [of OBB], which were developed 
decades ago, are static in nature and centered on the North American or European 
institutional structure. However, there are forces from evolving technologies and 
globalization that are dramatically affecting the nature of B2B buying and challenging the 
validity of these models and their underlying assumptions” (Lilien 2016, p. 5). Due to the 
high level of practical and theoretical impact, it is not surprising that OBB research is 
presently one of the top research priorities of the Institute for the Study of Business Markets 
and the Marketing Science Institute (Institute for the Study of Business Markets 2018; 
Marketing Science Institute 2018). In particular, ISBM asks, “To what extent is extant 
knowledge on buying centers and buyer behaviors still valid?” To this end, it is important 
for marketing academics to both reexamine existing OBB models, as well as fill in 
knowledge gaps that still remain (Grewal et al. 2015; Lilien 2016).   
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to review existing literature on organizational buying 
behavior in order to highlight research gaps that have significant implications for marketers 
in the present buying and selling environment. Through this review it is apparent that there 
is presently a significant gap in knowledge regarding organizational buying behavior in the 
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public sector. This gap is surprising considering the significant financial impact that public 
sector purchases have on the United States’ and world economy (Lilien 2016). Following 
the review of existing OBB literature, this dissertation uses a grounded-theory approach 
using case study methodology to develop a conceptual framework of organizational buying 
behavior in the public sector. In doing so I also explore the role of competition among 
suppliers competing for a buyer’s business in order to shed light on how suppliers can 
compete more effectively when selling to public sector organizations. 
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2. Organizational Buying Behavior Research: A Review and Future Directions 
 
Much of the existing research on OBB and buying centers is based on models developed 
in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s (e.g., Robinson, Faris, and Wind 1967; Sheth 1973; 
Webster and Wind 1972). “Organizational buying behavior includes all activities of 
organizational members as they define a buying situation and identify, evaluate, and choose 
among alternative brands and suppliers” (Webster and Wind 1972, p. 14). The buying 
center “refers to all those members of an organization who become involved in the buying 
process for a particular product or service” (Johnston and Bonoma 1981a, p. 143). Whereas 
organizational buying behavior is a system of processes, the buying center is the group of 
individuals representing a customer firm at the center of these processes. In order to 
understand organizational buying behavior it is imperative to understand buying center 
composition, and how this composition affects the processes that result in the selection of 
a final supplier. In this section, I discuss and integrate the foundational models of OBB and 
the subsequent research that followed in order to develop a general model of the present 
state of knowledge regarding organizational buyers and the organizational buying process.   
 
2.1 Seminal Models of Organizational Buying 
 
The foundational models of organizational buying behavior in marketing were developed 
by Webster and Wind (1972) and Sheth (1973). While these models were developed 
separately, both contain many similar constructs, likely due to the fact that each model 
builds on similar literature from the late 1960’s (e.g., Robinson, Faris, and Wind 1967). 
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For example, both models include the effects of environmental, organizational, task, group, 
and individual variables on organizational buying. The variables form the foundation for 
much of the subsequent organizational buying literature spanning 45 years. As such, it is 
important to understand the similarities and differences of these models that have been 
instrumental in shaping organizational buying literature. 
 
The Webster and Wind model (1972) differs from the Sheth model (1973) in that the former 
focuses in greater detail on the context of the buying task that affects buying center 
composition while the latter focuses more on group processes. For example, Webster and 
Wind highlight how factors such as product availability and the buying firm’s competitive 
environment affect characteristics of the purchase, and in turn individuals will be recruited 
for involvement in the purchase (such as managers or engineers), resulting in the buying 
center’s final composition of members. Buying center composition refers to the final 
demographics of the buying center such as experience of members, education, and total 
size of the buying center (Webster and Wind 1972). With such a large number of variables 
that can potentially impact buying center composition, the Webster and Wind model 
implies that each buying center is likely a unique composition of members that differs both 
within and between buying organizations (Johnston and Lewin 1996). 
 
The Sheth (1973) model differs from the Webster and Wind model in two key respects. 
First, the Sheth model focuses less on the context of the buying task, and more on how 
group processes account for organizational buying outcomes. For example, group decision 
making processes can have positive or negative impact on the final decision depending on 
   
5 
 
the type of conflict resolution tactics used (e.g., problem-solving and persuasion being 
positive, and bargaining and politicking being negative). Conflict resolution is noted as 
important to OBB due to the inevitability of diverging interests between team members. 
Second, the Sheth model focuses more on information search and use in the organizational 
buying process than do Webster and Wind (1972). The Sheth model describes key 
differences in what information buying center members may have in the beginning of the 
process, how they may choose to actively collect information going forward, and how 
members may choose to use this information during the buying process. Sheth notes an 
important factor in the joint decision-making process is “assimilation of information, 
deliberations on it, and the consequent which most joint-decisions entail” (p. 54). 
 
Based on the variables of interest within extant organizational buying literature, it is useful 
to organize variables into three categories; inputs, processes, and outcomes (see Figure 
2.1). In the general model presented here, inputs refer to situational characteristics that 
determine what product will be purchased and who will be involved in the purchase. 
Processes refer to the behaviors and actions of buying center members that lead to purchase 
outcomes. Finally, purchase outcomes refer to the impact of these processes on the buyer 
and supplier organizations. In the two foundational models of organizational buying, 
environmental, organizational, task, group, and individual characteristics are examples of 
inputs, while information search, influence, participation, and conflict management are 
examples of processes. Outcomes in organizational purchasing include purchase choice or 
buying team member satisfaction in the outcome. These foundational models have served 
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as a significant foundation from which organizational buying literature has been built over 
the last 45 years.  
 
In order to develop my review, I focused on research conducted from these seminal papers 
onward. In order to identify articles, I used EBSCOhost Business Source Complete to 
search Journal of Marketing, Journal of Marketing Research, Journal of the Academy of 
Marketing Science, Journal of Business Research, International Journal of Marketing 
Research, Industrial Marketing Management, Journal of Personal Selling and Sales 
Management, Journal of Business-to-Business Marketing, Journal of Business and 
Industrial Marketing for the terms “organizational buying,” “business buying,” 
“organizational purchasing,” and “organizational buying.” Next articles were eliminated 
on the basis of whether or not they focused directly on the organizational buying process. 
For example, a majority of articles focused on buyer-seller relationships and not the 
organizational buying process itself. Based on this process, 219 articles were reviewed for 
this paper. In the next sections, an input, process, and outcome framework is used to 
organize and review extant organizational buying literature that builds on these 
foundational models.  
 
2.2 Defining the Organizational Buying Process 
 
Organizational buying was originally defined as a “decision-making process carried out by 
individuals, in interaction with other people, in the context of a formal organization” 
(Webster and Wind 1972, p. 13). More recently organizational buying has been defined as 
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“four ongoing processes: implementation, evaluation, reassessment, and confirmation” 
(Grewal et al. 2015, p. 195). In the latter definition, implementation includes activities that 
are “undertaken to acquire and receive goods and services directly, within the parameters 
of the current buying decision” (Grewal et al. 2015, p. 195). As such, the newer definition 
includes traditional organizational buying in stage one, that is, the buyer engages in 
discussion with many suppliers about a potential purchase. While stages two through four 
focus on the exchange process between a specific supplier, or suppliers, and the buying 
organization. This distinction is important because in the latter stages an official 
relationship is established between buyer and supplier that is difficult to terminate (Heide 
and Weiss 1995).  
 
Based on this distinction I think it is important to define organizational buying from a more 
traditional perspective. I define organizational buying as the active search for a product or 
service supplier through a formal or informal process (Sheth 1973). This process begins 
when a buyer identifies a need and concludes when a supplier, or suppliers, is selected to 
provide a solution to meet that need. Once the selection occurs, the buying process 
transitions to the organizational exchange process, which is the “activity between two or 
more organizations that has consequences, actual or anticipated, for the realization of their 
respective goals or objectives” (Achrol, Reve, and Stern 1983, p. 58). Active search is a 
key component of the current definition of organizational buying. Firms often gather 
information on a passive basis with no intention of actually using that information to take 
action (Doney and Armstrong 1996). Buyers often acquire information on suppliers or 
solutions through various sources such as trade shows (Gopalakrishna and Lilien 1995) or 
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internet searches (Steward, Narus, and Roehm 2017). However, buyers may not initiate the 
buying process as a result of this new information, but instead hold onto it until much later 
when the buying process is initiated for some other reason. 
 
In contrast, active search leads members within the buying organization to actively seek 
out new product or service solutions. Since Robinson, Faris, and Wind (1967), 
organizational buying models have ranged from four stages (Grewal et al. 2015; Sheth 
1973) to eight stages (Johnston and Lewin 1996; Robinson, Faris, and Wind 1967). Based 
on my review I propose a four-stage model of organizational buying: Need Recognition, 
Specification Development, Proposal Request, and Proposal Evaluation. These stages were 
identified by reviewing existing literature proposing various stages in the buying process 
(e.g., Verville and Halington 2003; Vyas and Woodside 1984; Webster and Wind 1972) 
then combining stages based on buyers’ expected outcomes at each stage in the process. 
 
The Need Recognition stage occurs when the buying organization identifies a discrepancy 
between the organization’s current performance and potential performance (Webster and 
Wind 1972). In this stage representatives of the buying organization determine whether it 
is feasible to achieve better performance through buying products or services from an 
outside supplier. Buyers may examine the resources needed to develop a solution within 
the organization, choose to contract with someone outside the organization, or some 
combination (Heide 2003). Interestingly, there is evidence that buyers may initiate the 
process for other reasons than a perceived discrepancy in current state. For example, buyers 
may go through the buying process in order to gain market information and increase 
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organizational learning (Dawes, Lee, and Midgely 2007). In public purchasing it is 
common for the federal government to go through the buying process on a regular schedule 
such as every three or five years (General Services Administration 2005). Regardless of 
the reason, the outcome of the Need Recognition stage is to determine if there may be value 
in going through the buying process. If so, the purchase moves into the Specification 
Development phase. 
 
The outcome of the Specification Development stage is for buyers to determine the 
requirements necessary for a solution to the identified need. It is at this point that the buying 
center begins to develop. The buying center is composed of all individuals that are involved 
in the buying process (Johnston and Bonoma 1981a). When developing specifications, 
buying firms often include more individuals than at other points in the buying process 
(Lilien and Wong 1984; Tanner 1998). This occurs as the buying organization often solicits 
feedback from individuals within the buying organization who will be affected by the 
purchase (Leigh and Rethans 1984; Verville and Halington 2003; Vyas and Woodside 
1984). In addition to sources from within the buying organization, specification 
development occurs by gathering information from many external sources ranging from 
the internet (Kennedy and Deeter-Schmelz 2001) to direct communication with salespeople 
(Lilien and Wong 1984). Once buyers have reached confidence in the developed 
specifications, the buying process moves to the Proposal Request stage. 
 
The purpose of the Proposal Request stage is to solicit suppliers for a response to the 
buyer’s specifications. Requesting supplier proposals consists of acquiring written or 
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verbal communications from suppliers about how closely they can provide a solution that 
addresses buyer specifications (Verville and Halington 2003; Vyas and Woodside 1984). 
The request from buyers can come in the form of a formal request for proposal (RFP) or 
request for quote (RFQ), or a request for a presentation from suppliers (Johnson, Friend, 
and Malshe 2016; Verville and Halington 2003). The Proposal Request stage often starts 
with a list of pre-identified suppliers that may have been involved in previous purchases or 
through information gathering in the Specification Development phase (Verville and 
Halington 2003; Vyas and Woodside 1984). At this point buyers may pre-screen suppliers 
and determine, based on current knowledge, whether new suppliers need to be added or 
deleted from this list (Verville and Halington 2003; Vyas and Woodside 1984). Buyers and 
suppliers may also communicate during this phase to clarify any questions that arise from 
ambiguity of supplier specifications. Once clarification is finished, suppliers submit their 
responses for buyer evaluation, at which point the Proposal Evaluation stage begins. 
 
The purpose of the Proposal Evaluation stage is to determine whether or not to select a 
supplier, and if so, which supplier(s) to select. If a supplier or multiple suppliers are chosen, 
buyers also engage in the negotiation process to reach a final contract offering (Verville 
and Halington 2003; Vyas and Woodside 1984). The evaluation process is an intensive 
process where buyers compare supplier proposals against buyer specifications and to other 
supplier responses (Crow, Olshavsky, and Summers 1980; Verville and Halington 2003; 
Vyas and Woodside 1984). The evaluation occurs through both individual and group 
decision making processes, where buyers form individual perceptions and reach a final 
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selection through group discussion (Crow, Olshavsky, and Summers 1980; Wilson, Lilien, 
and Wilson 1991; Vyas and Woodside 1984).  
 
It is important to note that recent research has identified that the buying process is much 
more dynamic than is often depicted in existing marketing literature (Bunn 1993). There is 
some recent evidence that buyers move forward and backwards through the buying stages 
(Makkonen, Olkkonen, and Halinen 2012; Verville and Halington 2003). For example, 
information gathered when evaluating supplier proposals may cause buyers to rethink 
specifications (Verville and Halington 2003). In addition, many of the organizational 
buying variables that have been examined in previous research are significantly affected 
by the stage of the buying process. As such, it is important to examine organizational 
buying variables in relation to the stage of the buying process. In the next section, I 
integrate these buying stages with variables organized around an input, process, and 
outcome framework (Ilgen et al. 2005, see figure 2.1) in order to develop research 
propositions and highlight areas for future research.  
  
2.3 Inputs to the Organizational Buying Process 
 
I define inputs to the organizational buying process as the contextual factors that affect the 
buying process. Inputs can be separated into several high level categories including the 
environmental, organizational, individual, and buying task that affect how the organization 
defines its needs (Anderson, Chu, and Weitz 1987; Johnston and Bonoma 1981a). In turn, 
the inputs affect the processes through which a decision is made (Crow, Olshavsky and 
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Summer 1980; Hunter, Bunn, and Perrault 2006; Wilson, Lilien, and Wilson 1991). The 
processes are actions that buyers take in order to reach the decision, which include 
information gathering, interpersonal influence, conflict resolution, and decision making. 
The outcomes of the buying process have been predominately focused on supplier 
selection, but also include, supplier preferences, length of decision making process, and 
choice satisfaction. In the next sections, I discuss existing inputs, processes, and outputs in 
the existing organizational buying behavior literature. 
 
2.3.1 Environmental Inputs 
 
Environment is defined as the geographic, ecological, technological, economic, political, 
legal, and cultural factors that affect the information, opportunities, and constraints of the 
buying task (Webster and Wind 1972). Empirical research has shown several links between 
environmental inputs and buying center composition to support Webster and Wind’s 
(1972) original propositions. Environmental inputs commonly examined in existing OBB 
literature include number of suppliers (Choffray and Lilien 1978; Homburg and Kuester 
2001; Kauffman and Leszczyc 2005; Vyas and Woodside 1984), environmental 
uncertainty (Alejandro et al. 2010; McCabe 1987; Spekman and Stern 1979), relational 
norms (Heide and John 1992; Palmatier, Dant, and Grewal 2007), and technology 
(Stremersch et al. 2003; Weiss and Heide 1993). 
 
Research has shown that the organizational buying process is materially affected by the 
number of suppliers in the marketplace and the resulting number of suppliers who vie for 
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the buyers business (Hunter, Bunn, and Perrault 2006; Vyas and Woodside 1984). It 
appears that buyers often prefer to evaluate three to four suppliers during the decision 
making process (Vyas and Woodside 1984). As the number of suppliers involved in the 
purchasing process grows larger, the result is greater time and effort required by buyers to 
evaluate suppliers (Vyas and Woodside 1984). As a result, they often use a process of 
conjunctive elimination whereby suppliers with the lowest scores on the most important 
attributes are eliminated one by one until a manageable set of suppliers (e.g., four) is left 
for more detailed evaluation (Crow, Olshavsky, and Summers 1980). However, recent 
research has shown that buyers may benefit in some purchasing situations by increasing 
the number of suppliers in the consideration set as high as ten (Kauffman and Leszczyc 
2005). In situations where price is a significant portion of the consideration, having a higher 
number of suppliers increases price competition among suppliers. 
 
Environmental uncertainty is generally measured as the amount of information available 
in the marketplace to make a good decision (McCabe 1987; Spekman and Stern 1979). 
Environmental uncertainty has been linked to an increase in number of individuals 
involved in the purchase decision, as well as decentralization of decision making authority 
(McCabe 1987; Spekman and Stern 1979; Wilson, Lilien, and Wilson 1991). As 
environmental uncertainty increases, organizations often include a greater number of 
individuals in the purchase decision (McCabe 1987; Lewin and Donthu 2005), the amount 
of information that buyers access during buying process (Alejandro et al. 2010), and the 
number of suppliers considered for purchase (Kauffman and Leszczyc 2005; Kull, Oke, 
and Dooley 2014).  
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Another environmental input that has been shown to affect the buying process is relational 
norms (Heide and John 1992). “Relational norms are expectations about behavior that are 
at least partially shared by a group of decision makers” (Heide and John 1992, p. 34). 
Research has shown that relational norms are related to the way in which buyers approach 
relationships with salespeople (Palmatier et al. 2008), and determine the buying center 
members’ mindset when beginning the buying process (Leigh and Rethans 1984). Leigh 
and Rethans (1984) provide evidence that organizational buyers have knowledge and 
expectations about how the purchasing process will play out based on their previous 
experiences during the buying process. These expectations affect how the buyer prepares 
for the buying task through information search and approach to decision making (Qualls 
and Puto 1989).  
 
Technology has long played a significant impact on organizational buying as it often 
determines the information available to buyers (Grewal et al. 2015; Lilien and Wong 1984), 
facilitates communication between buyers and suppliers (Agnihotri, Rapp, and Trainor 
2009; Presutti 2003), and can affect the urgency of which solutions are evaluated 
(Stremersch et al. 2003; Weiss and Heide 1993). As a result of technological advancement, 
buyer access to information is increasing while costs for acquiring the information is 
decreasing (Grewal et al. 2015). However, technological complexity of customer solutions 
is increasing (Stremersch et al. 2003), leading to more complex interactions between 
buyers and suppliers during the buying process (Grewal et al. 2015; Schmitz and Ganesan 
2014). 
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Overall, environmental variables play an important role on OBB as they can directly affect 
the suppliers in the marketplace and the solutions available to buyers. They also appear to 
impact the way in which buyers and suppliers interact during the buying process. 
Interestingly, little research has examined how organizational buying and selling changes 
across industries. While research has looked at the buying process in different contexts 
such as industrial manufacturers purchasing raw materials (Vyas and Woodside 1984), 
lithographic printing (Silk and Kalwani 1982), and software (Verville and Halington 2003), 
there are still several significant areas that remain unexamined. For example, Lilien (2016) 
highlights that public sector purchases account for billions of dollars annually, yet there is 
virtually no research regarding public sector purchases. Public organizations have a high 
level of oversight and regulations compared to their private sector counterparts (e.g., 
General Services Administration 2005), future research could benefit by examining the 
differences between public and private purchases. As such, I offer the following research 
question: 
 
RQ1: How does organizational buying behavior differ in public sector organizations 
from private organizations? 
 
2.3.2 Organizational Inputs 
 
The next inputs that materially affect the organizational buying process are those related to 
the organization. Organizational inputs include organization size, the structure of the 
organization, organizational goals, and technological constraints (Webster and Wind 
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1972). Early organizational buying research focused more heavily on organizational 
characteristics than environmental characteristics (Johnston and Lewin 1996).  
 
Originally, organizational buying literature hypothesized that formalization and 
centralization in the buying process was related to characteristics of the purchase (e.g., 
novelty and complexity). Formalization refers to the degree to which the buying task is 
governed by rules, procedures, and buyer roles are defined within the group (Dawes, Lee, 
and Dowling 1998; McCabe 1987), while centralization refers to how concentrated and at 
what organizational level final decision making within the buying process occurs (Barclay 
1991). In contrast to previous organizational buying theories, recent research has provided 
evidence that formalization is more closely related to organizational structure than 
purchase characteristics (Lewin and Donthu 2005). Research has shown that as 
organizations increase in size, so does the level of formalization and centralization of the 
buying center (Barclay 1991; Grønhaug 1976), the number of individuals involved in the 
buying center (Johnston and Bonoma 1981a), and buying center conflict (Barclay 1991).  
However, it appears that as purchase uncertainty, novelty, and complexity increase, the 
relationship between organization formalization and buying center formalization weakens 
(Lewin and Donthu 2005). 
 
In addition to formalization and centralization, employee reward structures have been 
shown to materially affect the organizational buying process. Reward structures have the 
ability to incentivize employees to participate more or less in the organizational buying 
process (Anderson and Chambers 1985). For example, employees that receive direct 
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benefits from the outcome of the buying process (e.g., buying a new computer system 
makes their job easier) are more likely to participate than those who receive no benefits 
(Anderson and Chambers 1985; Dawes, Lee, and Dowling 1998). Rewards may also create 
conflict in the buying process when rewards are different between buying center members 
(Barclay 1991). This occurs as members with different incentives often disagree on the 
importance of different specifications in the buying process (Barclay 1991). For example, 
procurement may wish to keep costs down while engineering wants to purchase the highest 
quality product. In addition to conflict in the buying center, research has also examined the 
impact of rewards on supplier selection. Buyers are often risk averse when it comes to 
buyer selection, however, reward structures can induce buyers to consider riskier suppliers 
when incentivized to do so (Anderson and Wynstra 2010). 
 
Overall, organizational factors highly influence the processes through which organizational 
purchasing is carried out. The degree of formalization and centralization of decision 
making are important influences on group level outcomes, while reward structures 
influence both the level of individual participation and individual conflict within the group. 
Presently, there is still lack of clarity as to how these variables operate within the different 
stages of the buying process. For example, it appears that riskier decisions involve more 
individuals in the buying process, but the final decision in the process is made by fewer 
individuals (McCabe 1987). This may provide an explanation for previous findings that 
show managers are more involved in making final decisions than product users (Lilien and 
Wong 1984; Silk and Kalwani 1982). 
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Present research on the impacts of organizational inputs on OBB is limited in two respects. 
First, it is limited in that generally only a single member of the buying center is often used 
to investigate the entire buying process. Not only that, many of the informants for existing 
research come from the National Association of Purchasing Managers (e.g., Barclay 1991; 
Leigh and Rethans 1984; Michaels, Day, and Joachimsthaler 1987). Future research would 
benefit by including a greater number of individuals involved in the buying process in order 
to create a more complete picture of individual motivations (Dawes, Lee, and Dowling 
1998).  
 
Second, centralization and formalization in the buying process is mainly examined at the 
process, rather than stage level. Research has shown that specification development, an 
earlier buying stage, is a less formalized process (Johnston and Bonoma 1981b) while the 
later supplier evaluation stage is often a more formalized process (Vyas and Woodside 
1984; Wilson, Lilien, and Wilson 1991). Since centralization and formalization affect 
several significant organizational buying variables, such as buyer information search 
(Dawes, Lee, and Dowling 1998), an important contribution of future OBB research could 
be to examine how variation of formalization and centralization affect the buying process 
differently. For example, does having a set of procedures for developing buyer 
specifications lead to better or worse proposals submitted by suppliers?. As a result, I offer 
the following research questions: 
 
RQ2: a) How do changes in centralization and formalization across different stages 
in the buying process affect buyer behavior? b) How do changes in centralization 
and formalization across different stages in the buying process affect suppliers? 
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2.3.3 Buying Task Inputs 
 
The next significant input variables in the general model of organizational buying are those 
related to the buying task. These include buyclass (new purchase, modified rebuy, straight 
rebuy), product type, purchase importance, purchase complexity, and purchase risk. Early 
organizational buying research appears to have focused more heavily on these 
characteristics than either organizational or environmental characteristics (Johnston and 
Lewin 1996). Buyclass was one of the original variables proposed to affect buying center 
composition  and decision making (Robinson, Faris, and Wind 1967), which resulted in 
being one of the first variables to be repeatedly tested (e.g., Anderson, Chu, and Weitz 
1987; Grønhaug 1976; Jackson, Keith, and Burdick 1984; Johnston and Bonoma 1981a).  
New purchases are those that the buying organization has no previous history of making 
(Robinson, Faris, and Wind 1967). As a result, new purchases are often more complex and 
riskier than purchases the organization has made previously. A straight rebuy is a purchase 
of a product or service that the organization has made previously (Robinson, Faris, and 
Wind 1967). For straight rebuys the buying organization does not make any changes from 
what it has purchased previously, and generally has a high level of knowledge and 
experience about the purchase. Straight rebuys involve relatively low effort for the 
organization as there is little information needed to make the purchase decision. Often, 
straight rebuys are routinized to the point where organizational buyers fill out a purchase 
order on a repeated basis with no adjustment or consideration of alternative suppliers 
(Anderson, Chu, and Weitz 1987). Modified rebuys fall between new purchase and straight 
rebuys, and constitute the most typical organizational purchases (Anderson, Chu, and 
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Weitz 1987). Modified rebuys are purchases that an organization has made before, but 
requires some level of adjustment from the previous purchase (Jackson, Keith, and Burdick 
1984). For example, an organization may have previously purchased computers, but 
chooses to upgrade the functionality in the subsequent purchase. While the organization 
has familiarity with computers, it is likely buyers will need to acquire some new 
information as a result of changes in technology since the previous purchase.  
 
While some research has supported the proposed relationship between buyclass and buying 
center composition, and between buyclass and decision making processes (e.g., Anderson, 
Chu, and Weitz 1987), other research has not supported these relationships (e.g., Johnston 
and Bonoma 1981a). The explanation for mixed findings appears to be the combination of 
importance, complexity, and risk of the purchase, rather than the buyclass itself. Robinson, 
Faris, and Wind (1967) noted that generally new purchases are more novel, more complex, 
and more important than straight rebuys. Research has generally supported the proposition 
that buyclass groups these variables together fairly well (Anderson, Chu, and Weitz 1987; 
Bunn and Clopton 1993; McQuisten 1989), but not in all cases (Bunn 1993). In new 
purchases, for example, the novelty and complexity is likely to be higher than that of a 
straight rebuy. Research has shown that novelty, complexity, and importance can affect the 
buying process independently of one another (McQuisten 1989). In fact, Bunn (1993) noted 
two potential additional buyclasses from the original model: judgmental new task, and 
complex modified rebuy. Judgmental new tasks are purchases where complexity and 
importance are low, resulting in decreased perception of risk than for more traditional new 
purchases. Complex modified rebuys include modified rebuys where complexity and 
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importance are higher than expected than the average modified rebuy, resulting in greater 
perceptions of risk (Bunn 1993). 
 
There are several independent relationships associated with higher levels of complexity. 
For example, increasing complexity results in a need for more information to make the 
purchase (Anderson, Chu, and Weitz 1987). As information needs increase, buyers consult 
a greater number of sources in order to make sure they make the best decision (Bunn and 
Clopton 1993). With newer purchases typically high in purchase complexity, the result is 
a greater number of individuals involved in the buying process (McQuisten 1989). 
Interestingly, the number of individuals involved at different stages in the buying process 
appears to change. For example, more individuals are often included at earlier stages in the 
buying process than later ones (Anderson, Chu, and Weitz 1987; Lilien and Wong 1984; 
Verville and Halington 2003). What’s more, the individuals involved at each stage in the 
buying process also changes (Lilien and Wong 1984; Verville and Halington 2003). 
While a large number of individuals has been shown to benefit the organization through 
increased knowledge, it has also be shown to serve a second purpose. Organizational 
buyers often try to mitigate the risk associated with complex and important purchases by 
increasing the level of lateral and vertical participation in the buying center (Johnston and 
Bonoma 1981a). Vertical participation refers to the number of hierarchical levels involved 
in the purchase decision within the buying organization (Johnston and Bonoma 1981a). 
Lateral involvement refers to the number of departments involved in the purchase decision 
within the organization (Johnston and Bonoma 1981a). Varying levels of lateral and 
vertical involvement occur because buyers are motivated by potential professional gains 
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and losses as a result of the buying task (Anderson and Chambers 1985). When purchasing 
risk is high, buying center members may include a greater number of individuals in the 
buying process in order to spread the blame of a bad decision (Wilson, Lilien, and Wilson 
1991).  
 
In summary, characteristics related to the purchase such as complexity and importance 
have a strong influence on buying center composition and the organizational buying 
process. Overall, increases in complexity and importance are significantly related to who 
is involved in the buying process as well as their level of participation during the different 
stages in the buying process. While some research on buying tasks has been conducted, 
several areas remain unexplored. One major area presently unexamined is how the buying 
task variables affect member participation at different points in the buying process. While 
research has provided evidence that buying center members’ participation and influence 
changes throughout the buying process (e.g., McQuisten 1989; Verville and Halington 
2003), it is less clear as to why participation changes and what happens as a result.  
 
Based on this review I propose a new variable to organizational buying literature termed 
“buying center fluidity.” I define buying center fluidity as the degree to which buying 
center decision-makers change throughout the buying process. Further research regarding 
buying center fluidity should provide significant insight into group processes such as 
information search, participation, and influence. In addition, examining the fluid nature of 
buying centers may also provide significant insight for sales practices. Since salespeople 
are valuable sources of information (Bunn and Clopton 1993; Moriarty and Spekman 
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1984), salespeople might provide value for the buying firm by serving as a resource to 
educate new members as they are brought into the buying process. As a result of this 
discussion, I offer the following research question: 
 
RQ3: How does buying center fluidity affect the organizational buying process? 
 
2.3.4 Group and Individual Inputs 
 
Individual inputs to the buying process include group and individual characteristics of the 
buying center. It is important to note that the buying center group variables are the 
aggregation of individual variables within the buying center (Webster and Wind 1972). 
Individual variables include education, motivation to participate, risk preferences, and 
position within the organization (Johnston and Lewin 1996; Sheth 1973; Webster and Wind 
1972). Research in this area highlights how the background of individuals contributes to 
the way the buying center ultimately functions. For example, research has shown that 
individuals with a higher rank (e.g., manager vs. CEO) and greater centrality within the 
organization are perceived to have a higher level of influence within the group (Ronchetto, 
Hutt, and Reingen 1989). Centrality refers to the degree to which buyers are connected to 
other employees within the buying organization (Ronchetto, Hutt, and Reingen 1989). 
Hierarchies within the buying center often determine the types of influence strategies that 
are used, as well as the level of influence participants are likely to have at different stages 
in the decision making process (Venkatesh, Kohli, and Zaltman 1995). For example, users 
of a product, such as engineers in a manufacturing plant, are often likely to initiate the 
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buying task due to their specific knowledge of product specifications. However, managers 
often make the final decision due to their authority over finances (Silk and Kalwani 1982).  
 
Buying center member role perceptions within the buying center have also been shown to 
have a significant relationship with buying center behavior. For example, role ambiguity 
and role stress within organizational buying teams can lead to lower performance outcomes 
(Michaels, Day, and Joachimsthaler 1987). Often in these situations employees are unsure 
of what they need to contribute to the group, and let those they perceive to be more involved 
make the decision. The causes of role ambiguity and role stress stem from uncertainty 
within the buying task as buying centers that lack formalization have higher levels of role 
ambiguity and stress (Barclay 1991). 
 
Individual risk preferences have also been shown to affect decision making. For example, 
individuals with low risk preference often choose suppliers with which they have higher 
familiarity, regardless of if the supplier offers the best choice (Brown et al. 2012; Puto, 
Patton, and King 1985). Risk preferences are significant to buying center decision making 
as Webster and Wind (1972) note that it is one of two causes of individual behavior, the 
second being individual goals. Buying center members are driven to participate in the 
buying process by the goals they perceive they will achieve. However, goal achievement 
is often compared against the perceived risk to achieve it. For example, a purchasing 
manager who is compensated on cost savings and product performance, will likely weigh 
the two against each other in determining to choose a supplier based on quality or price. 
Overall, individual inputs affect group decision making through the impact on information, 
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participation, influence, and conflict, making these variables some of the most impactful 
on organizational buying behavior.  
 
While much research has examined the individual goals and risk preferences on buying 
center interactions and individual buyer behaviors, the assumption is that buyers are at least 
somewhat interested in being part of the decision making process. However, some buying 
center research has highlighted that buying center members are often uninterested in being 
involved in the decision making process (Tanner 1998). Buyers cite the reason for 
involvement occurs as they are volunteered by superiors to be involved and see 
involvement as more of a nuisance than anything. What’s more, most models often ignore 
the role of buying center members that are located outside the buying firm. For example, 
research has shown that consultants often play a role in the buying process (Brossard 1998; 
Dawes, Lee, and Midgley 2007; Johnston and Bonoma 1981a). Despite the prominence of 
these buying center members, little is known as to how these individuals are chosen to be 
included in the buying process. As a result, I propose the following research questions: 
 
RQ4: a) How are employees chosen to be part of the buying process and how does 
this selection affect OBB? b) How do organizations decide whether to include 
buying center members outside the organization and how does it affect OBB? 
 
2.4 Organizational Buying Processes 
 
OBB literature typically looks at several key processes that determine organizational 
buying outcomes: Information search and utilization (Grønhaug 1976; Anderson Chu and 
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Weitz 1987; Bunn 1993; Heide and Weiss 1993; Spekman and Stern 1979), individual 
participation (Anderson and Chambers 1985; Dawes, Lee, and Dowling 1998; McQuisten 
1989), interpersonal influence (Kohli 1989; Ronchetto, Hutt, and Reingen 1989; 
Venkatesh, Kohli, and Zaltman 1995), and conflict management (Barclay 1991; Ryan and 
Holbrook 1982). Together, these processes significantly affect decision-making within the 
buying team (Johnston and Lewin 1996). In this section, I summarize each of these 
processes and their relationships with decision-making outcomes. 
 
2.4.1 Information Search 
 
Gathering, analyzing, and utilizing information have been the common focus of existing 
OBB literature since their proposed importance in original OBB models (Johnston and 
Lewin 1996). These models hypothesized that information search was significantly related 
to many of the input factors discussed in the previous section. Information is a key construct 
within OBB models as information used by both individuals and the group determine 
buying specifications (Moriarty and Spekman 1984), which individuals to involve in the 
buying center (Krapfel 1985), which suppliers to consider (Choffray and Lilien 1978; Vyas 
and Woodside 1984), and final selection (Choffray and Lilien 1978; Hada, Grewal, and 
Lilien 2013; Webster and Wind 1972). 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, information search is often dependent on 
organization and buying task inputs (Bunn and Clopton 1993). Early research focused on 
buyclass as a significant antecedent of information search behavior, providing evidence 
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that information search increases as purchases move from straight rebuy to new purchases 
(Grønhaug 1976; Anderson Chu and Weitz 1987; Bunn 1993; Heide and Weiss 1993; 
Spekman and Stern 1979). Information search is also significantly related to product 
complexity, purchase importance, perceived vendor switching costs, decision time, and 
perceived product compatibility within the buying team (Heide and Weiss 1995; Hunter, 
Bunn, and Perrault 2006; Moriarty and Spekman 1984; Weiss and Heide 1993). Early in 
the buying process, buyers search for information to help them develop specifications and 
identify suppliers that may be able to provide solutions to the identified specifications 
(Vyas and Woodside 1984; Verville and Halington 2003). As the buying process 
progresses, it appears that information search turns from exploratory in nature, to 
confirmatory in nature. For example, in early stages buyers look for what suppliers are in 
the market (Vyas and Woodside 1984) while in later stages they collect information to 
confirm which supplier to select (Hada, Grewal, and Lilien 2014). 
 
Along with search for information, the type of information source itself has been shown to 
be an important variable in determining OBB (Aarikka-Stenroos and Makkonen 2014; 
Hada, Grewal, and Lilien 2014). Early research in OBB broke information sources into two 
main categories: personal and impersonal sources (Moriarty and Spekman 1984). Personal 
sources of information are those that come from individuals such as a product expert or 
salesperson, while impersonal sources of information are materials such as brochures or 
product websites (Moriarty and Spekman 1984). Type of information source is important 
to the organizational buying process as previous research has shown impersonal sources 
are sought earlier in the buying process, with their importance to decision making varying 
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by product type (Moriarty and Spekman 1984; Jackson, Keith, and Burdick 1987). In 
addition, buying center members are more likely to use personal sources of information 
throughout the entire buying process, and even more so when the purchase is perceived as 
important (Anderson, Chu and Weitz 1987; Bunn and Clopton 1993; Grønhaug 1976; 
Moriarty and Spekman 1984). In addition to situation, information source is often related 
to experience. Those individuals with higher levels of experience tend to rely more on 
information they already have, and are less likely to search for additional information 
(Weiss and Heide 1993). However, if more experienced employees do search for 
information, they may have the tendency to perceptually distort information so that it 
confirms their previous point of view (Sheth 1973). 
 
The results of present research on information search and use in organizational buying 
provide a somewhat significant picture; as the level of purchase importance increases, the 
level of information sought by the organization to make the purchase also increases. The 
impact of acquired information can have a positive and negative effect on OBB. On the 
positive side, information often gives firms a more competent and confident choice in their 
selection (Krapfel 1985). The major downside to information search is an increase in the 
amount of time needed to make a decision (Dholakia et al. 1993; Weiss and Heide 1993). 
Interestingly, information search is noted as occurring early in the organizational buying 
process and decreases as the buying process progresses (Vyas and Woodside 1984). Early 
research noted that information search can be expensive and time consuming (Moriarty 
and Spekman 1984), and as such, buyers may have been incentivized to collect all 
necessary information in the beginning of the process.  
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Recent developments in technology have lowered these barriers to information search in 
terms of both cost and ease (Grewal et al. 2015). As a result, traditional models of 
information search in the organizational buying process are needed (Lilien 2016). Access 
to information is now much less expensive and much easier to acquire thanks to such tools 
as the internet (Alejandro et al. 2010; Deeter-Schmelz and Kennedy 2004; Grewal et al. 
2015). The results of this increased access to information on the organizational buying 
process are likely to be numerous. For example, how and when do buying center members 
acquire information? It is possible that due to technology, buying center members acquire 
information at a greater frequency throughout the different stages of the buying process. 
Verville and Halington (2003) provide evidence that information search at early stages 
affect future information search and decision making processes, which highlight significant 
need for better understanding of this process.  
 
This dynamic process of information search behavior has implications for both interactions 
among buying center members, as well as interactions between buying centers and 
suppliers. For example, buyers may adapt their buyer specifications more frequently 
throughout the buying process than previously. This may in turn impact the speed and 
extent to which suppliers must adapt their sales approaches (Spiro and Weitz 1990). Future 
research on organizational buying should examine in greater detail how and why 
information search changes at different stages in the buying process in order to better 
understand its impact on OBB. Based on this, I offer the following research questions: 
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RQ5: a) How do recent technological innovations affect information search at each 
stage in the buying process? b) How does information search affect subsequent 
stages in the buying process?  
 
2.4.2 Individual Participation 
 
Early research regarding participation in the organizational buying process highlighted 
purchase importance and risk as two key antecedents to lateral and vertical involvement 
(Anderson, Chu, and Weitz 1987; Johnston and Bonoma 1981a; Lewin and Donthu 2005; 
McQuisten 1989). That is, greater purchase importance and risk lead to a greater number 
of departments represented in the buying center (lateral involvement), as well as a greater 
number of managers from different organizational levels (vertical involvement). Once 
individuals are chosen to be a part of the buying center, there are several factors that 
determine when and how much they participate in the buying process.  
 
While several studies have examined participation within specific stages of the 
organizational buying process (e.g., Silk and Kalwani 1982; Lilien and Wong 1984; 
Verville and Halington 2003; Vyas and Woodside 1984), the majority of research has 
examined individual participation as total participation across all stages (e.g., Anderson, 
Chu, and Weitz 1987; Dawes, Lee, and Dowling 1998; Johnston and Bonoma 1981a; 
Krapfel 1985; Michaels, Day, and Joachimsthaler 1987). Overall, results have shown that 
higher levels of participation in the buying process occur when individuals are stakeholders 
in the decision outcome (Dawes, Lee, and Dowling 1998; Kohli 1989) or when they are 
incentivized to participate through rewards (Anderson and Chambers 1985; Morris, Paul, 
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and Rhatz 1987; Tanner 1996). Examples of stakeholders include individuals who will be 
using the end product, or those whose budget is affected by the purchase decision. 
Individuals may also be incentivized to participate due to their reward structure within the 
organization (Anderson and Chambers 1985). An example of this would be a purchasing 
manager who is compensated through cutting costs. In this case the purchasing manager 
may become more involved in advocating a low cost provider whereas a purchasing 
manager with no incentive based on the outcome may act more passively, such as taking a 
project manager role within the buying center.  
 
The result of higher levels of involvement by individuals in the buying center are increased 
influence (Dawes, Lee, and Dowling 1998; McQuisten 1989), control of information 
(Dawes, Lee, and Dowling 1998), and increased advocacy behavior towards specific 
suppliers (Krapfel 1985). Interestingly, research has not examined the behaviors of 
individuals in the buying center who have low incentive towards the outcome. Often, OBB 
research assumes individuals are interested in achieving greater influence in the buying 
process and thus are likely to participate more. However, the opposite is also likely to occur 
for those individuals with not much to gain (low reward) and much to lose (high risk). A 
significant gap in existing OBB literature can be filled through greater understanding of 
how low participating individuals affect the buying process.  
 
A significant gap in existing OBB research is that many studies often use “key informants” 
as the information source. Key informants are often highly knowledgeable individuals who 
have deep understanding of the purchase being studied (Dholakia et a. 1993; McQuisten 
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1989; Weiss and Heide 1993). Since reward and motivation significantly affect buyer 
behavior, existing findings may miss key insights about buyers who are engaged in the 
buying process but much less motivated (e.g., Tanner 1998). Future research may better 
understand the organizational buying process by gaining perspective from individuals who 
participate less in the buying process. For example, it is assumed that buyers in the present 
environment are more knowledgeable because they have greater access to information than 
ever before (Grewal et al. 2015). However, with the growing technological and 
organizational complexity (Schmitz and Ganesan 2014), there may be significant gaps in 
knowledge between buyers with low and high motivation. The question, then, is how does 
buyer motivation and engagement affect the organizational buying process in the present 
environment? As a result, I offer the following research question: 
 
RQ6: How do differences in individual participation between buyers affect group 
decision-making? 
 
2.4.3 Interpersonal Influence 
 
With the integrative nature of buying decisions among group members, interpersonal 
influence has been of particular interest to organizational buying behavior scholars. Early 
research regarding organizational buying behavior examined which individuals were 
influential during decision making within the organizational buying process (e.g., Silk and 
Kalwani 1982). Influence within buying centers is often determined by those who are most 
involved in the buying process (McQuisten 1989) and those with higher levels of power 
(Kohli 1989; Silk and Kalwani 1982). However, not all types of power are created equal in 
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their influence during the organizational buying process. Research has consistently shown 
that buying center members with high levels of expert and reinforcement power carry the 
most influence, while referent power, information control, and legitimate power appear to 
have less of an effect (Kohli 1989; Ronchetto, Hutt, and Reingen 1989; Silk and Kalwani 
1982).  
 
Expert power refers to those individuals that are perceived by others within the group to 
have a high level of knowledge prevalent to the buying task (Kohli 1989). Reinforcement 
power on the other hand refers to an individual’s ability to mediate positive or negative 
rewards (Kohli 1989). Research has shown that expert power appears to have the strongest 
influence on members within the buying center regardless of time pressure or group 
cohesiveness (Kohli 1989; Venkatesh, Kohli, and Zaltman 1995). However, expert power 
is weakened when individuals use strong influence attempts (Kohli 1989). Conversely, 
reinforcement power appears to be more effective when strong influence attempts are used 
by the individual, and also when groups are less cohesive (Kohli 1989). For example, 
research has shown that engineers (experts) tend to be more influential when purchasing 
components for manufacturing, while purchasing managers are more influential when 
purchasing services (Jackson, Keith, and Burdick 1984). While far from extensive, some 
research has examined how influence changes depending on stage of the purchasing 
process (e.g., Silk and Kalwani 1982). Users of the product tend to be more influential 
when developing purchasing specifications and purchasing managers more influential 
when choosing the final supplier (Silk and Kalwani 1982; Vyas and Woodside 1984). 
These differences in influence are suggested to be a result of the general stake each member 
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has at that point in the process. For example, the cost of the purchase comes out of the 
managers’ budget so they are more likely to be involved in final supplier selection than 
specification development. 
 
Finally, research regarding influence has examined the types of influence attempts used by 
members within the buying center. Kohli (1989) noted that strong versus weak influence 
attempts changes the amount of influence an individual has within the buying center, 
depending on if their type of power  expert or reinforcement. When experts used strong 
influence attempts (e.g., repeated attempts) level of influence decreased. Conversely, when 
individuals with reinforcement power used strong influence attempts, perceived influence 
increased. Venkatesh, Kohli, and Zaltman (1995) followed with an examination of coercive 
versus non-coercive influence attempts and the impact on influence within buying centers. 
Results of their research showed again that the type of power was related to influence, 
depending on the strategy employed. For example, those with expert power were more 
influential when they used low coercive strategies such as making a recommendation, 
while those with reinforcement power were more influential when using harder coercive 
strategies such as making threats.  
 
One area overlooked regarding influence in the organizational buying process is how 
influence strategies change depending on the stage of the buying process. With research 
showing differing effects of influence by power type, future research should examine how 
different stages in the buying process affect influence strategies. For example, non-coercive 
strategies might be used differently depending on whether the individual is trying to 
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influence others to develop specifications, or select a final vendor. The type of influence 
strategy used can provide interesting implications for how buying center members interact 
with each other following the attempt. For example, use of coercive strategies early in the 
buying process may lead to negative responses later in the process. As a result, I propose 
the following research question: 
 
RQ7: How does buying center influence change at different stages in the buying 
process? 
 
2.4.4 Conflict Management 
 
“[C]onflict becomes a common consequence of the joint decision-making process; the 
buying motives and expectations about brands and suppliers are considerably different for 
the engineer, the user, and the purchasing agent, partly due to different educational 
backgrounds and partly due to company policy” (Sheth 1973, p. 55). As highlighted by 
Sheth, group decision making is likely to lead to conflict, and how the group handles this 
conflict is a strong predictor of the outcomes the buying center is likely to achieve (Barclay 
1991; Lambert, Boughton, and Banville 1986).  
 
Within organizational buying, conflict typically arises from differing individual 
preferences such as product specification importance or reward structure of buying center 
members (Barclay 1991; Sheth 1973). In order to lessen negative outcomes of conflict 
within the buying center, there are several options the group may choose. First, open 
communication between buying center members has been shown to directly reduce conflict 
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(Barclay 1991). In their research, Vyas and Woodside (1984) noted that any disagreements 
between members of the buying center were settled through mutual discussion. “We have 
to deal with many departments within the company. If differences arise (in choice criteria 
or in dealing with the vendors), I voice my opinion. We discuss it, see each other's point of 
view, and try to decide what is best for the company. We try not to get personalities 
involved. I have been in purchasing for over 25 years and this approach has always worked” 
(purchasing manager, Vyas and Woodside 1984, p. 34). Informants within their study noted 
that it was important for purchasing members to keep an open mind and be willing to 
compromise as needs constantly change throughout the buying process.  
 
Some strategies that have been shown to reduce conflict include increasing formalization 
(Barclay 1991) and greater information sharing among buying center members (Lambert, 
Boughton, and Banville 1986). Greater formalization governing the decision making can 
lower the amount of ambiguity experienced by group members and thus decrease the 
potential for conflict (Barclay 1991). Barclay noted that formalization may act as a way for 
leaders in the buying group to control other buying center members’ behavior. Information 
sharing brings greater clarity to the reasons behind buyer perceptions and thus allows for 
buying center members to discuss disagreements and resolve them (Lambert, Boughton, 
and Banville 1986). 
 
Interestingly, little research has examined the outcome of conflict resolution on purchase 
satisfaction of individual buyers and buying centers. It is possible that using different 
conflict resolution strategies may lead to a supplier selection, but it is unclear if buyers who 
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compromise may fully support the selection. As a result, I propose the following research 
question: 
 
RQ8: How do buyer conflict resolution strategies affect buyer purchase 
satisfaction? 
 
2.5 Organizational Buying Outcomes 
 
The typical outcome of the organizational buying process is final selection of a supplier or 
multiple suppliers that the buying center perceives can best meet the organization’s needs. 
Other outcomes of the organizational buying process include individual and group level 
satisfaction with the final decision, however research in this area is somewhat limited. 
Information search, influence, and conflict management are critical to reaching a final 
solution across each of the stages in the decision making process (Bunn 1993; Choffray 
and Lilien 1978). However, few studies have examined differences within each process 
stage, likely due to the difficulty of acquiring this data (Anderson, Chu, and Weitz 1987; 
Vyas and Woodside 1984). This difficulty occurs due to the fact that often buying center 
members include somewhere between three and eight members, and that the process occurs 
over an extended period of time, usually many months. 
 
Much of the existing literature regarding decision making in organizational buying has 
focused on modeling the overall process (e.g., Choffray and Lilien 1978; Crow, Olshavsky, 
and Summers 1980; Wilson, Lilien, and Wilson 1991). In the initial stage of the process, 
individuals within the buying center develop a set of suppliers that may be able to provide 
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a solution for the organization (Choffray and Lilien 1978; Vyas and Woodside 1984). Once 
individuals determine this set of suppliers, individuals narrow the set of alternatives down 
based on environmental constraints such as technology, and organizational requirements 
such as budget (Choffray and Lilien 1978; Crow, Olshavsky, and Summers 1980). Once a 
set of feasible alternatives is developed, individuals form their own preferences based on 
personal evaluation criteria. Group preferences are then developed based on each buying 
center members’ individual preferences and the interaction between buying center 
members (Choffray and Lilien 1978). 
 
Seven models of group choice have been proposed and tested in organizational buying 
literature (Choffray and Lilien 1980; Wilson, Lilien, and Wilson 1991). The seven models 
are weighted probability model (combination of individual preferences weighted by 
influence and importance of each member), equiprobability model (all decision 
participants have equal weight and decide what proportion of business to give each 
supplier), voting model (choice is based on a vote by members), preference perturbation 
model (choice is made of vendor that makes all members least upset), majority rule model 
(supplier is chosen by accumulating a specific number of votes), unanimity model (supplier 
is chosen when all buying center members agree on one supplier), and autocracy model 
(choice of supplier is ultimately decided by a single member of the buying center).  
 
Wilson, Lilien, and Wilson (1991) tested a contingency model of group choice by 
examining how well each decision making model predicted choice in different buying 
situations (e.g., new task vs. rebuy). Results of their analysis showed that no single decision 
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making model best predicted group choice, and processes were dependent on the specific 
buying task. However, results did support the notion that individual decision making (e.g., 
autocracy model) was used more often when purchase risk was low, such as in a straight 
rebuy situation. Interestingly, in their study of organizational buying behavior, Vyas and 
Woodside (1984) noted that none of the buying centers examined used any formal type of 
decision making process. This highlights the conclusion that while present research 
highlights what types of decision processes can be used to make a decision, why these 
processes are chosen remains less clear (Wilson, Lilien, and Wilson 1991). Further research 
is needed to examine the decision making process in its entirety to better understand why 
buying centers use the decision making processes that they do (Wilson, Lilien, and Wilson 
1991). As a result, I propose the following research question: 
 
RQ9: How and why do buyers select different decision making processes? 
 
2.6 Discussion 
 
Based on my review it appears there are several key gaps in existing organizational buying 
literature that could provide significant contributions to marketing theory and practice. 
First, organizational buying literature has generally focused on organizational buying in 
the private sector, largely ignoring the public sector altogether (Lilien 2016). This gap is 
surprising considering both the financial magnitude of purchasing in the public sector and 
the significant differences in rules governing purchasing practices in the public sector. For 
example, government organizations must follow strict purchasing policies that are derived 
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from state and federal laws (e.g., General Services Administration 2005), that may go 
beyond policies in private practice. Another significant difference is the fact that employees 
and managers are often the key stakeholders for organizational purchases in the private 
sector, while citizens are also key stakeholders in public sector purchases. As noted 
previously, formalization and stakeholding are key components of the organizational 
buying process, so it should be expected that public versus private purchases will vary in 
both their processes and outcomes. As such, a greater focus on research in the area of 
organizational buying in the public sector should provide valuable insight for marketing 
theory and practice. 
 
In addition, future organizational buying research would benefit by greater examination of 
the dynamic nature of the organizational buying process. Much of the existing literature 
looks at variables such as formalization, participation, and information search in aggregate 
rather than by stage of the buying process. Bunn (1993) noted that the organizational 
buying process is much more dynamic than is often examined in existing organizational 
buying research. Verville and Halington (2003) used an inductive process to examine the 
buying process for ERP Process Software and provided greater evidence supporting this 
proposition. For example, they highlighted that information search was an iterative process 
where information gathered in one stage appeared to significantly affect actions in 
subsequent stages. In addition, other research has shown that the buying process is often 
embedded in many different processes within an organization (Makkonen, Olkkonen, and 
Halinen 2012). However, in the review of existing literature there still appears to be limited 
research examining how buyer and supplier behaviors in one stage affect subsequent 
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stages. Specifically, how suppliers engage buyers at different points in the buying process 
is especially limited. While several studies provided evidence that suppliers were valuable 
sources of information (Alejandro et al. 2010; Bunn and Clopton 1993; Moriarty and 
Spekman 1984; Verville and Halington 2003), little research has examined how being a 
valued source of information helps (or hurts) suppliers during this process. Existing buying 
and selling literature would benefit from greater focus on this important topic. 
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2.7 Tables and Figures 
Table 2-1: Review of Organizational Buying Literature 
 
Article Variables DVs Context Conclusions 
Webster and 
Wind 1972 
environment, 
organization, group, 
purchase (task), and 
individual 
characteristics 
OBB Process N/A Environmental, organizational, 
purchase, group, and individual 
characteristics should affect 
decision making across the 
organizational buying process. 
Sheth 1973 organization, 
product, individual 
characteristics; joint 
decision process  
OBB Process N/A Supplier or brand choice is 
determined through an integrative 
process of company, product, 
individual, and joint decision 
making factors. 
Grønhaug 1976 buyclass, 
product/service firm, 
organization size 
information 
search 
survey of 160 organizational 
buyers of an industrial 
computer manufacturer 
An organization's size leads to 
greater likelihood of purchasing 
department, search for information 
was lower for modified-rebuy than 
new task purchase, product 
independent firms were made 
riskier decisions 
Spekman and 
Stern 1979 
environmental 
uncertainty 
buying center 
structure 
survey of 320 members of 
buying groups across 20 
organizations in 11 industries 
 
 
 
 
Results showed that as the level of 
uncertainty in the environment 
increases, there is an increase in 
the number of members of the 
buying center in the final decision 
(joint decision making) 
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Crow, 
Olshavsky, and 
Summers 1980 
number of vendors, 
time pressure 
request for 
quotation, 
purchase 
decision 
simulation of decision making 
with 14 purchasing managers 
in the industrial 
manufacturing industry  
Authors showed that purchasing 
managers used conjunctive 
decision model to reach a selection 
of suppliers for an RFQ (narrow 
the decision set), and used a 
lexicographic choice model to 
choose a final supplier. 
Johnston and 
Bonoma 1981a 
organization size, 
complexity, 
formalization, 
centralization; 
purchase situation 
importance, 
complexity, novelty, 
and product class 
extensivity, 
lateral 
involvement, 
vertical 
involvement, 
connectedness, 
purchasing 
manager 
centrality 
interviews with 241 buying 
center members over 60 
different purchases 
Organization formalization and 
purchase importance had the 
highest impact on buying center 
network.  Importance lead to 
greater extensivity, and lateral and 
vertical involvement. Org. 
formalization lead to extensivity, 
lateral involvement, and 
connectedness. 
Ryan and 
Holbrook 1982 
responsibility, time conflict survey of 135 fleet 
administrators across multiple 
industries 
Some sub-decisions within the 
buying process result in more 
conflict than others 
Silk and 
Kalwani 1982 
job position, decision 
stage 
influence, 
involvement 
interviews and surveys of 50 
buying center members, in 25 
purchases, across 12 
organizations in the 
commercial printing industry 
Managers were more influential in 
final decisions, users were more 
influential in initiating changes. 
Involvement was somewhat 
accurately measured, influence 
was not. 
Jackson, Keith, 
and Burdick 
1984 
product, buyclass, 
decision type, and 
member 
influence survey using a role play 
scenario of 254 buying center 
members from 25 different 
companies across multiple 
industries 
Purchasing managers were more 
influential in choosing suppliers, 
while engineers were more 
influential when choosing parts. 
Results also showed that buyclass 
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didn't affect influence of 
participants. 
Leigh and 
Rethans 1984 
purchase situation script norms 109 members of a local 
purchasing managers 
association 
Organizational buyers have pre-
developed scripts of how a buying 
process is likely to be carried out. 
In addition these scripts are likely 
to change depending on 
characteristics of the purchase 
situation 
Lilien and 
Wong 1984 
job position, decision 
stage 
involvement survey of 2151 individuals 
involved in organizational 
purchasing within industrial 
manufacturing organizations 
Users (as classified by Webster 
and Wind 1972) are involved in 
earlier stages of the purchase 
process involving developing 
specifications, while deciders 
(such as managers) were involved 
more in later stages of the process 
such as selecting a supplier. 
Moriarty and 
Spekman 1984 
purchase, 
organization, and 
individual 
characteristics; 
buying phase 
sources of 
information 
survey of 663 buying center 
members across five 
industries (business services, 
transportation, 
retail/wholesale, finance, and 
manufacturing) 
Buying center members relied 
more on personal sources of 
information (colleagues, 
salespeople) than impersonal 
sources of information 
(advertisements, news 
publications). Salespeople were 
especially important when buying 
center participants were heavily 
concerned with making the right 
decision. 
Anderson and 
Chambers 
1985 
individual 
motivation, role 
perceptions and 
individual 
decision 
N/A Buying center member motivation 
to engage in buyer behavior is a 
function of intrinsic and extrinsic 
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abilities; group social 
influence, rewards, 
coalition, and 
hierarchical decision 
making 
making, group 
consensus 
motivation, group motivation is 
also dependent on extrinsic 
motivation (e.g., rewards). 
Krapfel 1985 information 
diffusion, source 
credibility, valence 
problem self-
confidence, 
advocacy, 
choice 
scenario based survey of 42 
buying centers consisting of 2 
to 3 members each, within a 
single industrial manufacturer 
Individuals can become advocates 
through being provided with more 
task relevant information, and 
advocacy is related to final group 
decisions 
Puto, Patton, 
and King 1985 
perceived risk, 
supplier loyalty, 
supplier price/quality, 
risk avoidance 
behavior 
supplier 
choice 
survey of 271 organizational 
buyers across multiple 
industries 
When vendor loyalty is high, PMs 
award contracts to their preferred 
vendor. When loyalty is low, PMs 
choose supplier with the highest 
perceived value. 
Anderson, 
Chu, and Weitz 
1987 
problem newness, 
information needs, 
consideration of 
alternatives, buyclass 
 survey of 169 sales managers 
from 16 organizations in the 
electronic component 
manufacturing industry 
New task purchases appear to be 
related to larger buying centers, 
slower decision making, greater 
uncertainty of needs, concerned 
with finding a good solution 
(rather than price), higher 
consideration of alternatives (e.g., 
"outsuppliers"), more influenced 
by technical personnel, and less 
influenced by purchasing agents. 
McCabe 1987 environmental 
uncertainty 
decision 
making 
centralization 
survey of 115 individuals 
from 68 buying centers in the 
airline and corrugated box 
industries 
Higher levels of uncertainty lead 
to decentralization of decision 
making. 
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Michaels, Day, 
and 
Joachimsthaler 
1987 
leader behavior, 
formalization 
role tress, role 
ambiguity, 
work 
performance 
survey of 1036 members from 
the national association of 
purchasing managers 
Positive leader behavior is related 
to lower role stress and lower role 
ambiguity. 
Kohli 1989 individual power; 
buying center size, 
familiarity, viscidity; 
purchase risk, time 
pressure, influence 
attempt strength 
manifest 
influence 
survey of 214 individuals 
from the national association 
of purchasing managers 
Expert power had the largest 
impact in influence. 
Reinforcement power had the 
second biggest influence. Expert 
power has greater impact when 
influence attempts are weak while 
Reinforcement power has the 
strongest impact when influence 
attempts are strong. 
McQuisten 
1989 
product novelty, 
complexity, and 
importance 
individual 
participation, 
influence 
survey of 182 members within 
82 different buying teams that 
were customers of one 
industrial equipment 
manufacturer 
Results showed that both novelty 
and importance were related to 
participation while only 
importance was related to 
influence. Research also showed 
that greater levels of participation 
lead to influence. 
Ronchetto, 
Hutt, and 
Reingen 1989 
centrality, formal 
rank, departmental 
membership 
latent 
influence, 
manifest 
influence 
interviews with 171 members 
of a network within an 
electrical systems producer 
Both centrality of the buying 
center member among the group 
network as well as formal rank 
determine the level of influence of 
the buying center member. 
Barclay 1991 organization size, 
complexity, 
formalization, 
centralization; 
purchase situation 
importance, 
conflict Survey of 328 matched pairs 
(purchasing 
manager/engineer) from 
Ontario Association of 
Purchasing Managers 
Centralization and differing 
reward structures among buying 
center members are related to 
increased conflict. Formalization 
can reduce the level of conflict 
among buying center members. 
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complexity, novelty, 
and product class 
Wilson, Lilien, 
and Wilson 
1991 
buyclass, financial 
risk, technical 
uncertainty 
decision 
choice 
Survey of purchasing teams 
from 32 organizations 
belonging to the National 
Association of Purchasing 
Managers, split into groups of 
3 (24 groups, 72 participants) 
and 2 (8 groups, 16 
participants) 
Perceived risk and buyclass 
determine the decision making 
process likely to be used by 
buying centers. For example low 
risk re-buys are likely to use 
autocratic while high risk new 
purchases appear likely to use a 
unanimity model. 
Bunn 1993 buyclass information 
search, 
analysis 
techniques, 
procedural 
control, 
proactive 
focus, 
purchase 
importance, 
task 
uncertainty 
buyer power, 
extensiveness 
of choice 
Interviews with 11 purchasing 
managers and 3 surveys 
consisting of 826 members of 
the National Association of 
Purchasing Managers, from 
52 industries 
There are 5 types of analysis used 
by buying centers; casual 
purchase, routine low priority, 
simple modified rebuy, judgmental 
new task, complex modified 
rebuy. Routine low priority, 
modified rebuy, and judgmental 
new task follow the original 
Robinson, Faris and Wind (1967) 
buying models of straight rebuy, 
modified rebuy, and new purchase. 
Bunn and 
Clopton 1993 
purchase importance, 
decision time, level 
of influence, 
negotiation intensity 
information 
use 
Survey of 636 members of 
National Association of 
Purchasing Managers 
Higher levels of purchase 
importance and purchase 
complexity lead to a wider number 
of information sources used. 
Lower levels of purchase 
importance and complexity lead 
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buying center members to use 
personal information sources such 
as internal experts or salespeople. 
Dholakia et al. 
1993 
organization size, 
buyclass, buying 
center size 
information 
sources used, 
number of 
alternatives 
considered, 
decision 
making time 
Survey of 1,199 
organizational buyers of 
telecommunications 
equipment 
Results showed that as decision 
making units grow in size, the 
greater the number of information 
sources used and the larger the 
number of suppliers considered. 
All of these factors in turn lead to 
longer decision making time. 
Weiss and 
Heide 1993 
compatibility, vendor 
switching costs, 
experience, 
technological change 
search effort, 
duration of 
purchase 
process 
Survey of 219 key contacts 
for organizations who had 
purchased computer 
workstations across multiple 
industries 
Overall, information search was 
related to compatibility concerns, 
vendor switching costs, and low 
levels of experience with the 
purchase. In turn higher effort 
increased the duration of purchase 
time. 
Kline and 
Wagner 1994 
experience information 
sources used 
Survey of 127 buyers of 
Fashion Group International 
Buyers with higher levels of 
experience relied more on their 
own knowledge, while salesperson 
information and customer needs 
were the other significant sources 
of information for making buying 
decisions 
Venkatesh, 
Kohli, and 
Zaltman 1995 
power, group 
viscidity, familiarity 
with target 
influence 
Strategy 
Survey of 187 members of the 
National Association of 
Purchasing Managers 
Individuals with higher referent 
power used less coercive strategies 
(e.g. threats) while those high in 
information power used 
information exchange, and those 
with expert power used 
recommendations 
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Brown 1995 reputation, 
salesperson attitude, 
experience, product 
cognition, purchase 
importance, risk, 
insupplier/outsupplier 
status 
attitude 
towards 
salesperson, 
attitude 
towards 
product 
Survey of 379 members of the 
National Association of 
Purchasing Managers 
Purchasing managers were more 
likely to use extrinsic cues for 
decision making with outsuppliers 
versus insuppliers. 
Heide and 
Weiss 1995 
technological change, 
product 
heterogeneity, 
compatibility, 
switching cost, 
purchase importance 
consideration 
set, supplier 
choice 
Survey of 219 members of the 
National Association of 
Purchasing Managers 
When technological change is 
rapid the result is a smaller 
consideration set and a higher 
probability of choosing an existing 
supplier. Prior experience did not 
affect decision set. Lack of 
experience and centralization lead 
to higher search behavior. 
Dawes, Lee, 
and Dowling 
1998 
stakeholding, 
participation, 
innovative 
orientation, 
decentralization, 
formalization, 
information control 
manifest 
influence 
Interviews with 98 buying 
center members within 41 
organizations (at least 2 
members from each buying 
center) 
Results show that individuals with 
higher stakeholding in the 
purchase participate more in the 
buying process, those more 
involved in the process tend to 
have higher control over 
information. Information control is 
significantly related to influence 
but appears to be low (.10) 
Hunter, Bunn, 
and Perrault 
2006 
procedural control, 
information search, 
proactive focus 
formal 
analysis 
Survey of 636 members of 
Institute for Supply Chain 
Management 
Purchase importance leads to 
search for information, while 
information search, buyer power, 
and proactive focus lead to use of 
formal analysis of potential 
suppliers. 
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Palmatier et al. 
2008 
industry norms, 
reward, salesperson 
competence, product 
dependence 
relationship 
orientation 
Survey of 269 buyer-
salesperson dyads from 538 
companies, across multiple 
industries 
Industry norms and reward 
structure were significantly related 
to the buyer's relationship 
orientation towards the 
salesperson. 
Hada, Grewal, 
and Lilien 
2014 
referral valence, 
referrer credibility, 
insupplier 
experience, 
outsupplier 
reputation 
referrer 
credibility, 
selection 
likelihood 
Two lab experiments 
conducted with MBA 
students. 
Supplier referrals matter more for 
outsuppliers than insuppliers. 
Balanced referrals lead to greater 
credibility but all-positive referrals 
lead to higher supplier evaluations. 
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Figure 2-1: Input-Process-Outcome Model of Organizational Buying Behavior 
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3 Selling to Barricaded Buyers 
 
3.1 Introduction 
“From the issue date of the solicitation [request for proposal] and until a supplier is selected 
for contract award and the selection is made public, suppliers are not allowed to 
communicate for any reason with any state staff regarding the solicitation...” (Georgia 
Procurement Code 2011, p. 83, emphasis added). 
 
“In 2008, nearly 80% of prescribers (Doctors) were considered accessible. Since then, that 
number has declined steadily, and just 47% of physicians are now accessible to sales reps” 
(ZS Associates AccessMonitor 2015, p. 1). 
 
As noted above, a common practice in business-to-government (B2G) and business-to-
business (B2B) transactions is for buyers to restrict suppliers’ access to them during the 
buying process. I term these buyers “barricaded buyers.” The incidence of barricaded 
buyers is pervasive, especially in the public sector. For instance, a detailed review of 
federal and state purchasing practices suggests that buyers restrict access to suppliers 
(barricade themselves) in some form or fashion at some point in the buying process (see 
Table 3.1). Why are buyers instituting policies that restrict suppliers’ access to them? The 
reasons appear to be the desire to increase their control and objective decision making 
during the buying process. For example, the state of California states that the restrictions 
are in place to create “fair and competitive [buying] processes” (2013 California Institute 
for Local Government, p. 1). 
 
Despite its prominence in practice, research related to barricaded buyers remains virtually 
non-existent. This may be due to the reliance on classic models of buyer behavior that 
implicitly assume that suppliers have unrestricted access to buyers across all stages of the 
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sales cycle (e.g., Lilien and Wong 1984; Sheth 1973; Webster and Wind 1972). The 
assumption may also be that research on “gatekeepers” addresses this issue (e.g., Dawes, 
Lee, and Dowling 1998; Robinson, Faris, and Wind 1967; Webster and Wind 1972). 
Gatekeepers are typically individuals who control the flow of information into and out of 
the buying center (e.g., Kohli 1989). As with classic models of buyer behavior, it is 
generally assumed that suppliers have the ability to contact gatekeepers (or other decision 
influencers) at any time during the buying process. In contrast, the barricades in the present 
research reflect the policies written into the purchasing process that limit supplier access. 
Once the barricade is erected, supplier contact with anyone involved in the purchase is 
significantly restricted and, in fact, can result in supplier disqualification if the barricade is 
violated. As such, the question remains, “How can suppliers sell to barricaded buyers?” 
The present research begins to address this question and, in doing so, makes the following 
contributions to the literature. 
 
I draw on extensive field work to develop a conceptual framework that highlights actions 
a focal supplier can take to gain a competitive advantage when selling to barricaded buyers 
(Figure 3.1). The framework identifies key variables across two phases of the buying 
process that impact the barricaded buying process. For instance, my results suggest that a 
focal supplier can increase its selection likelihood by disclosing novel solutions in its RFP 
(request for proposal) response rather than in its pre-RFP sales pitch. Thus, rather than 
implying that information sharing is broadly beneficial across all phases of the sales cycle, 
this framework suggests that a focal supplier can gain an advantage by strategically 
disclosing different types of information at different phases of the buying process. 
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Correspondingly, my research also addresses recent calls in the organizational buying and 
selling literature to take a more holistic view of the buying process (Franke and Park 2006; 
Hall, Ahearne, and Sujan 2015). More specifically, in addition to examining how a 
supplier’s actions affect buyers (e.g., Franke and Park 2006; Mullins et al. 2014), I 
demonstrate how a supplier’s actions can affect its competitors. For instance, I introduce 
the notion of “relationship peacocking” (i.e., the degree to which a supplier signals the 
strength of its relationship with the buyer to competitors) and demonstrate how it can 
demotivate a supplier’s competitors from responding to an RFP. Thus, I also complement 
research that examines competition at the firm level (e.g., Kumar, Jones, Venkatesan, and 
Leone 2011) by offering insights into how to impact competition at the transaction level. 
 
In addition, despite recent commentary questioning the significance of RFPs (Solis 2016), 
my research corroborates recent research that suggests a reemergence of the importance of 
RFPs (Johnson, Friend, and Malshe 2016). RFPs are especially important in barricaded 
buyer settings because buyers must rely more on the written supplier RFP response. 
Although prior research documents the importance of RFPs in the buying process (Johnson, 
Friend, and Malshe 2016; Leigh and Rethans 1984), examines how buyers use RFPs as an 
evaluation tool to narrow down the number of potential suppliers (Crow, Olshavsky, and 
Summers 1980; Vyas and Woodside 1984), and demonstrates how RFPs may be used as a 
learning tool to develop more fine-grained and updated RFPs (Nutt 1993), the literature 
remains limited in a couple of ways. First, research on how suppliers can shape buyer RFPs 
ex ante remains largely unaddressed. The present research identifies variables (e.g., unique 
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language) that a supplier can use to help buyers craft RFPs in the supplier’s favor. In 
addition, the implicit view in prior research is that RFPs are evaluated in an objective 
fashion ex post (e.g., lowest price, fastest delivery, and performance ratings) (Vyas and 
Woodside 1984). This research, however, suggests that subjective factors (e.g., tone, 
explicitness, and tailoring) may be as or more important than objective factors when 
making decisions. Somewhat ironically, therefore, buyers who barricade themselves in an 
effort to be more objective, may unknowingly increase their reliance on subjective factors 
when making decisions. 
 
Due to the limited research on barricaded buyers during the organizational buying process, 
I use a qualitative research approach to build my conceptual framework (e.g., Gebhardt, 
Carpenter, and Sherry 2006; Tuli, Kohli, and Bharadwaj 2007). My findings and 
contributions are based on a longitudinal participant observation of eight organizational 
purchases within a large public organization. The data collection encompasses multiple 
sources, including 46 depth interviews, 22 observations of buyer meetings, and analysis of 
29 supplier RFP responses over a period of approximately eighteen months. 
 
3.2 Method 
 
The present research develops a conceptual model of selling to barricaded buyers through 
a qualitative, grounded-theory approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 
1998) using case study methodology (Eisenhardt 1989; Narayandas and Rangan 2004). As 
in the present case, grounded-theory is best utilized when there is little existing knowledge 
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of the topic or when there are significant knowledge gaps (Strauss and Corbin 1998). 
Below, I provide additional details about the research setting, case selection, and data 
collection and analysis. 
 
3.2.1 Research Setting 
 
Our data collection took place within a large state organization that employs over 14,000 
people, and operates departments responsible for education, healthcare, law enforcement, 
construction, agriculture, and transportation, among others. The organization manages 
purchasing contracts totaling approximately $2 billion worth of products and services 
across all departments. I partnered with this organization because it uses a barricaded 
buying process and provided the opportunity to examine a variety of cases across diverse 
purchasing contexts (see Table 3.2). The organization follows state purchasing guidelines 
and processes that are consistent with those highlighted in Table 3.1. Therefore, my 
findings are likely to be applicable to buying and selling processes across most state and 
federal purchases involving RFPs.1 
 
3.2.2 Case Selection 
                                                          
1 An important distinction in the present research is the difference between the Request for Proposal (RFP) 
process and the Request for Quote (RFQ), also known as the Invitation for Bid (IFB), process. In the public 
sector, RFPs are generally used “[to] obtain complex services in which professional expertise is needed and 
may vary,” whereas RFQ/IFBs are generally used “[to] obtain simple, common, or routine services that may 
require personal or mechanical skills. Little discretion is used in performing the work” (California 
Procurement Code, p. 52). Generally, the RFP process is used for modified rebuy and new purchases, which 
is why we focus solely on RFPs. 
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I used a theoretical, rather than random, sampling procedure to provide a rich, diverse set 
of cases for the present research (Eisenhardt 1989). Specifically, I relied on two factors 
consistently linked to organizational buying behaviors and outcomes: buyclass (e.g., new 
purchase or rebuy) and type of purchase (i.e., products or services), in order to select cases. 
Buyclass and type of purchase are important considerations because they both affect the 
decision-making processes used in supplier selection (e.g., Anderson, Chu, and Weitz 
1987; Vyas and Woodside 1984). 
 
3.2.3 Data Collection and Analysis 
 
Prior to collecting data, I conducted several meetings with the Chief Purchasing Officer 
(CPO) and two procurement managers within the buying organization. The purpose of 
these meetings was to familiarize ourselves with the organization’s purchasing process. 
Procurement managers primarily serve an administrative function by acting as project 
managers in charge of ensuring buying center members follow procurement protocols laid 
out by the organization and the state.2 In this organization, procurement managers are 
purposely excluded from direct decision-making. This process is consistent with those 
found at the federal level and in other states. 
 
Buying centers typically included individuals across the organization who had expertise in 
the product or service being purchased and/or those who would be affected by it. For 
                                                          
2  State organizations are each governed by a set of purchasing regulations determined by the State 
Procurement Division. Organizational rules may also be applied to the required state regulations. 
   
58 
 
instance, in the general office software case, the buying center included the director of the 
department that would be using the software the most, an employee within the director’s 
department who would be working with the software program on a daily basis, an IT 
manager who would assist in implementation, and two potential users from other 
departments. Buying center members were tasked with making the ultimate decision. 
Typically, each buying center member voted on a supplier with the winning supplier 
receiving the most votes.  
 
The first author was granted full access to the buying process for each of the eight cases. 
This was achieved by adding the first author to the buying center as a full, non-voting 
member of each buying center. Access included the ability to collect direct and indirect 
communications for the duration of each case. Indirect communications included email 
correspondence among buying center members and between purchasing and suppliers, the 
written RFP sent to suppliers, and the written responses received from suppliers. Direct 
communication included individual interviews with buying center members at multiple 
points in the process, observation of buying center meetings, and observation of meetings 
with potential suppliers. 
 
Individual interviews followed the semi-structured interview process. The following 
questions were used as a guide: Please describe how you gathered information to develop 
the RFP; What specifications are/were important to consider for this purchase?; What did 
suppliers provide that was (un)helpful in evaluating the RFPs?; What are your overall 
perceptions of suppliers based on their RFP responses? In total, I conducted 46 interviews 
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across 31 buying center members of the eight cases resulting in approximately 18 hours of 
interview data (see Table 2). Most interviews were recorded using an IC Digital Voice 
Recorder with audio files transcribed verbatim. For those interviewees who declined to be 
recorded (five total), I took extensive notes and audio recorded field notes within 15 
minutes of interview completion. 
 
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Challagalla, Murtha, and Jaworski 2014), I analyzed 
the data via open, axial, and selective coding (Strauss and Corbin 1998). To begin the open 
coding process, I read through the transcripts independently to familiarize myself with the 
data. Once a level of familiarity was achieved, I identified high level concepts within the 
data. Next, I conducted axial coding that involves relating higher level categories to each 
other and to subcategories along more specific properties and dimensions. Finally, I 
conducted selective coding, which involves developing a theoretical framework through 
the identification of key variables within the data. Open, axial, and selective coding were 
performed through an iterative process whereby emerging themes were coded individually, 
followed by ongoing analysis throughout data collection to tighten the theoretical 
framework. This coding process has been used frequently in previous marketing research 
to provide important insights into novel phenomena (e.g., Homburg, Wilczek, and Hahn 
2014; Ulaga and Reinartz 2011). To facilitate the coding process, I used QSR 
International’s NVivo® 11 software. This process yielded a conceptual model that 
highlights important variables and mechanisms in the barricaded buying process (see 
Figure 3.1). The result of this process was development of ten research propositions that 
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focus on how suppliers can increase their selection likelihood when selling to barricaded 
buyers (see Table 3.3 for list of propositions). 
 
3.2.4 Purchasing Process in the Present Setting 
 
The traditional view of the buying process involves a number of steps, which typically 
includes the following activities: identification of a need, development of specifications 
that form a solution, identification of suppliers that may provide a solution, evaluation of 
suppliers, and final selection of a supplier or suppliers (Choffray and Lilien 1980; Crow, 
Olshavsky, and Summers 1980; Robinson, Faris, and Wind 1967; Sheth 1973; Vyas and 
Woodside 1984; Webster and Wind 1972). Traditional buying process models also 
implicitly assume that suppliers have relatively unrestricted access to buyers across these 
steps (Moriarty and Spekman 1984). The barricaded buying context, however, is quite 
different. 
 
Buyers may barricade themselves (i.e., restrict suppliers’ access) at any of point in the 
buying process. As is the case in many public organizations, the organization in the present 
research barricaded its buyers after the RFP was announced and made publicly available. 
Thus, until the announcement of the RFP, suppliers had relatively broad access to buying 
center members. As such, I focus on two key phases in the present research: the pre-RFP 
(or pre-barricade) phase and the post-RFP (or post-barricade) phase.3 In the pre-RFP phase, 
                                                          
3 In the present context, the post-RFP phase was particularly restricted. For instance, in the post-RFP phase, 
a buyer with a question for a supplier needed to write and submit the question(s) to a central procurement 
officer, who then forwarded the question to the supplier. The supplier, in turn, had to submit its response in 
writing to the procurement officer, who then forwarded the response to the buying team member. 
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buying center members sought to identify potential suppliers and began developing 
specifications that addressed their need(s) in the form of an RFP. In the post-RFP phase, 
buyers shifted their attention to the evaluation of suppliers and making a final selection. 
 
3.3 Conceptual Framework 
 
In the following sections, I integrate insights from my fieldwork to develop a conceptual 
framework (see Figure 3.1). I take the perspective of a focal supplier vying for a buyer’s 
business against other suppliers. This framework proposes two underlying mechanisms 
through which suppliers can impact their selection likelihood: reducing competitive 
intensity in the pre-RFP phase and enhancing RFP response quality in the post-RFP phase. 
 
Competitive intensity, as conceptualized here, refers to the degree of rivalry among 
suppliers bidding for a particular purchasing contract. Although competitive intensity is 
generally examined at the firm level (e.g., Grewal and Tansuhaj 2001; Kumar et al. 2011), 
my research suggests that it has significant implications at the transaction level as well. In 
particular, a focal supplier can increase its likelihood of selection by reducing the number 
and/or motivation of competing suppliers pursuing the contract (i.e., reducing competitive 
intensity). 
 
                                                          
Respondents in the present research suggested that this (laborious) process often precluded them from 
asking questions. 
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RFP response quality refers to the buyer’s evaluation of the overall superiority of the RFP 
response from a supplier (e.g., Zeithaml 1988). In the post-RFP phase, suppliers are less 
able to influence their competitors; therefore, they need to distinguish themselves by 
focusing their efforts on developing a quality RFP response. These overarching insights 
lay the foundation for a more in-depth discussion, which follows next. 
 
3.4 Results 
 
I divide the discussion of results into two phases: 1) the pre-RFP phase and 2) the post-
RFP phase. Within each phase, I identify novel variables under the control of a focal 
supplier that ultimately impact selection likelihood. I begin with the pre-RFP phase. 
 
3.4.1 Pre-RFP Phase 
 
As previously mentioned, suppliers have relatively broad access to buyers in the pre-RFP 
phase of the buying process. This is due to the fact there is no official purchase to be made; 
thus, there are few rules restricting buyer-supplier interactions. In this phase, buying center 
members are typically engaged in information search behavior in order to gather enough 
information to develop specifications for the RFP. My research shows that this information 
search behavior by buyers provides suppliers with unique opportunities to enhance their 
competitive position –via RFP shaping and competitor perception shaping – thereby 
resulting in greater selection likelihood. 
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3.4.2 RFP shaping 
 
RFP shaping is the degree to which a supplier influences the content contained in the 
buyer’s formal RFP. Influencing the content of the RFP is important because it can 
preclude competitors from responding effectively to the RFP. The present research 
identifies two key ways that suppliers can shape the RFP –by instilling their unique 
language and by focusing on their unique capabilities. 
 
3.4.3 Unique Language  
 
Unique language refers to terminology for products and services that is distinctive to a 
specific supplier. The present research suggests that a supplier can reduce competitive 
intensity if buyers include its unique language in their formal RFPs. Suppliers can increase 
their likelihood that buyers will include their unique language in their RFPs in a couple of 
ways. Buying center members often came from various parts of the participating 
organization and had very little purchasing experience. Thus, they frequently asked 
vendors to give product demonstrations (e.g., software demonstrations) and/or to provide 
them with sample RFPs they had responded to in other instances. For example, the buying 
committee chair in the general office software case, who included a supplier’s unique 
language in his buying center’s RFP, described the process he used to develop the RFP: 
I had never done an RFP before so I started piecing it together from multiple 
sources…. The supplier demo, the sample RFP from the [demo] supplier… 
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By educating buyers via product demonstrations and other materials, a supplier familiarizes 
buyers with its unique language, which increases the likelihood the buyer will incorporate 
this language into its formal RFP. When a focal supplier’s unique language is included in 
an RFP, it becomes difficult for competitors to respond effectively because they are less 
clear about what buyers are asking for. As such, competing suppliers may be unable to 
identify appropriate solutions which can preclude them from submitting an RFP response 
at all. 
 
In addition, a focal supplier who is able to instill its unique language into an RFP gains an 
advantage because buyers understand the supplier’s solution (in the post-RFP phase). The 
buying committee chair in the general office software case elaborated: 
When we looked at [the] proposal, some of the language, we kind of knew 
what they were talking about when they would say dash 4 or whatever, 
because we had seen what those [screens] look like. I mean we kind of knew 
what we were looking at when we got an RFP, because you know RFPs, 
there are very few screen shots. Sometimes it could be hard to relate the 
language that you see in an RFP to an actual visual product that you're 
purchasing, so that helps for the [suppliers] that we had [met with] prior to 
the RFP. 
 
As a result of instilling its unique language into the buyer’s formal RFP, a focal supplier 
can decrease the competitive intensity of the transaction by decreasing its competitors’ 
motivation and capability of submitting a quality RFP response (Chen, Tsu, and Tsai 2007; 
Smith, Ferrier, Ndofor 2001). These assertions align with existing theories of 
communication and motivation within work settings. For instance, prior research suggests 
that individuals who work together often develop a shared language (Wiersema and Bantel 
1992). This shared language has positive outcomes on work performance because there is 
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greater understanding of the task (Barrick et al. 1998). In contrast, individuals who have 
difficulty understanding the task are likely to feel unmotivated to complete the work, and 
may give up on the work altogether (Thomas and Velthouse 1990). Formally,  
 
P1: A focal supplier can increase its selection likelihood by increasing buyer 
familiarity with its unique language during the pre-RFP phase. 
 
3.4.4 Unique Capabilities 
 
Our research suggests that a focal supplier can benefit by focusing its efforts on 
communicating the value of its unique capabilities to buyers in the pre-RFP phase. Unique 
capabilities are firm-specific competencies and/or skills that provide an advantage over the 
competitors (Makadok 2001; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1997). Communicating unique 
capabilities is beneficial for suppliers because it can induce buyers to include them as 
requirements in the RFP. As a result, competitors are likely to be less motivated and less 
capable of developing quality RFP responses (Chen 1996; Chen, Tsu, and Tsai 2007; 
Smith, Ferrier, Ndofor 2001). For example, in the pest control case, Supplier 1 promoted 
its round-the-clock service (a capability unique to them). This capability was subsequently 
included in the formal RFP. Consequently, one competitor [Supplier 2] alerted the 
purchasing manager they would not be submitting an RFP response due to their perceived 
inability to offer the solution requested. The committee chair provided additional insights 
as follows: 
I think [our RFP] evolved into so much more than what [Supplier 2] 
expected. [We added] the 24/7 365 emergency call requirement offered by 
[Supplier 1], which probably drove [Supplier 2] away. We requested that 
they [the RFP responders] are available all the time which most suppliers 
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likely can’t or don’t want to do. Companies don’t want to handle [unique 
situations], it takes a special person to do that. 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, however, suppliers frequently “shot themselves in the foot” by 
identifying needs for which they were not uniquely capable of addressing. For instance, in 
the general office software case, a focal supplier identified the buyer’s need for 
customization (a need the focal supplier could address). As a result, the buying committee 
chair wrote the following question directly into the RFP that was distributed to all potential 
suppliers: 
Describe the system configurations and customizations. Applications 
should be flexible, scalable, and configurable for ease of use of the end 
users. 
 
Unfortunately, in this purchasing project, the result was the selection of a competitor who 
was able to provide a superior level of customization over the focal supplier who had 
originally identified the need. The focal supplier in question had identified a need for which 
it was at a competitive disadvantage. Thus, it is important for suppliers to elicit needs and 
offer capabilities in the pre-RFP phase that they are uniquely able to address in order 
preclude competitors from effectively responding.  
 
P2: A focal supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater focus on 
its unique capabilities during the pre-RFP phase. 
 
While P2 is somewhat straightforward, it provides the foundation for a broader discussion 
about strategic information disclosure. Strategic information disclosure is the 
thoughtfulness and timeliness with which a focal supplier provides information to buyers. 
Although prior research on buyer behavior naturally highlights the importance of 
identifying customer needs in order to identify solutions (Sheth 1973; Tuli, Kohli, and 
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Bharadwaj 2007; Ulaga and Reinartz 2011; Webster and Wind 1972), rarely does it specify 
when suppliers need to convey what types of information about the solution in order to 
ensure supplier success in the face of competition. As a result of the present exploration, it 
is apparent that suppliers can enhance their competitive position by identifying unique 
information in the pre-RFP phase in order to shape the buyer’s RFP in their favor. 
However, if the information is not unique, suppliers may benefit from withholding the 
information until a later time when competitors are incapable of responding with their own 
solution (discussed in the post-RFP section). 
 
3.4.5 Competitor Perception Shaping  
 
Competitor perception shaping is the degree to which a focal supplier influences 
competitors’ beliefs about its connection to the buying organization. I identify two 
behaviors that shape competitor perceptions and, in turn, their motivation to engage in the 
transaction: relationship peacocking and information peacocking. 
 
3.4.6 Relationship peacocking  
 
Relationship peacocking is the degree to which a supplier signals the strength of its 
relationship with the buyer to competitors. It is common practice for government purchases 
to have a pre-RFP meeting or series of meetings with potential suppliers (which may 
include facilities walk-throughs and/or inspections) in order to clarify complex information 
that will be included in the RFP. These meetings also allow suppliers to ask any clarifying 
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questions they may have prior to responding to the RFP. They are attended by most, if not 
all, competing suppliers, which provides opportunities to shape competitors’ perceptions.4 
I reviewed state purchasing policies to identify the prevalence of these pre-RFP 
conferences. In my review I noted that all state purchasing policies at the state and federal 
level mentioned the potential for pre-RFP meetings (see Table 3.4). 
 
For instance, during one of these meetings in the waste management case, the incumbent 
supplier confidently discussed its chances of keeping the account. When I subsequently 
asked a member of the buying team why the supplier was exhibiting this behavior, he 
offered: 
I think it's just arrogance and entitlement on the part of the CEO of the 
[incumbent supplier]. He has connections inside the [buying organization] 
that go beyond his business connections, and he's just kind of resting on 
some of those laurels since they [competitors] know about it. 
 
Consequently, one of the suppliers who was present during the pre-RFP meeting chose not 
to submit an RFP response. The purchasing manager reached out to this supplier to inquire 
why it chose not to respond to the RFP. The supplier explained that it felt it would not be 
able to submit a competitive RFP response against the incumbent.5 
 
                                                          
4 In many cases, pre-RFP meetings require attendance by suppliers in order to submit an RFP response later 
in the process. 
5 In this case, the incumbent won the deal despite the negative impression peacocking evoked from the buying 
team. Note that peacocking behavior is most likely to come from an incumbent; however, this need not 
always be the case. For example, a supplier might have established a good relationship with a buyer outside 
of work, or from previous sales encounters for other products at the current buying organization. In some 
cases, a supplier might have developed a relationship with a buyer when the buyer was at a different 
organization. 
   
69 
 
3.4.7 Information Peacocking  
 
Information peacocking is the degree to which a supplier signals the strength of its 
knowledge about the buyer to competitors. In both the waste management and pest control 
cases, a supplier made explicit comments about how much it knew about the buyer’s 
account. For example, the incumbent supplier in the pest control case took over much of 
the buyer’s two-hour initial facility walkthrough. The supplier even corrected the 
purchasing manager about information that was incorrect: 
 
Procurement Manager: As you will note on page 6 of the proposal we are 
requesting service for seven buildings. 
Supplier 1:  It says seven, but the current service is for eight 
buildings. I think that needs to be corrected. 
Procurement Manager:  Oh, you are correct, I don’t think that number got 
updated. 
 
The supplier also made several comments about the level of service the buying organization 
was receiving throughout the walkthrough. It mentioned that the buying organization 
received service every 30 days for each building and often required “spot checks” for areas 
that could be potential future problems. These comments made a strong impression on the 
buyers who were present during this meeting and were mentioned several months later 
when the buying center met to evaluate RFP responses: 
[Supplier 1] was Johnny on the spot with his walkthrough. You can 
definitely tell that [they] know our account inside and out. 
 
Presumably, these comments also made a strong impression on competitors because seven 
of the eight suppliers chose not to even respond to this RFP. 
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Although I am unaware of peacocking behavior in extant marketing literature, such 
behavior has a foundation in the interpersonal relationship literature on mate retention 
(Buss 1988; Buss and Shackelford 1997; Sela et al. 2017). Mate retention tactics are those 
behaviors individuals exhibit to prevent a partner from getting involved with someone else 
(Buss 1988). By using a retention tactic, such as relationship peacocking, a supplier signals 
the strength of its customer relationship to competitors. Similar tactics used to protect 
interpersonal relationships have been shown to reduce a competitor’s motivation to try to 
“poach” a mate (Buss and Shackelford 1997). My observations in the organizational buying 
and selling context appear congruent with these findings. Thus, suppliers who use a 
peacocking strategy may reduce their competitor’s motivation to invest time and effort into 
their RFP response and, in fact, may demotivate competitors from responding at all. As a 
result, suppliers can decrease competitive intensity and increase their selection likelihood. 
More formally, I propose: 
 
P3: A focal supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater use 
of relationship peacocking during the pre-RFP phase. 
 
P4: A focal supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater use of 
information peacocking during the pre-RFP phase. 
 
3.4.8 Post-RFP Phase 
In the post-RFP phase, suppliers have very little access to buying team members (i.e., 
buying teams barricade themselves in this phase).6 As a result, competitors are generally 
                                                          
6 As mentioned, this phase is highly formalized in the public/government sector because it is governed by the 
state procurement code. The state procurement code for the participating organization precludes buying 
team members from having any direct contact with suppliers until after the buying process is complete. Any 
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unaware of each other’s actions and, as such, unable to respond to them. For example, 
suppliers do not know the content of other suppliers’ RFP responses or whether they 
submitted an RFP response at all. The present research suggests that a focal supplier can 
take advantage of its competitors’ inability to respond by focusing on key variables that 
are particularly influential to the buyers’ perceptions of RFP responses. 
 
3.4.9 RFP Response 
 
Through my interviews and observations of buying center meetings, RFP response quality 
was a consistent topic of discussion. Recall that RFP response quality refers to the buyer’s 
evaluation of the overall superiority of the RFP response from a supplier (e.g., Zeithaml 
1988). The present research suggests two sets of variables that can significantly impact 
RFP response quality – RFP content and delivery. RFP content refers to what is included 
in the RFP response, while RFP delivery refers to the presentation of the content. I 
identified novel solutions, consummate solutions, and reference congruency as important 
content factors that impact RFP response quality. Somewhat surprisingly, buying team 
members focused much, if not more, of their attention on the delivery of the content in the 
RFP responses. Correspondingly, the present research suggests RFP response tone, 
explicitness, and tailoring as important delivery variables associated with RFP response 
quality. Careful attention to RFP content and delivery can increase the perceived quality of 
the RFP, thereby increasing a supplier’s selection likelihood. 
                                                          
unauthorized contact leads to the dismissal of buyers from the decision-making process. This language is 
common across many states’ procurement codes (see Table 3.1). 
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3.4.10 Content: Novel Solutions  
 
Novel solutions are supplier offerings that address customer needs in an imaginative way. 
I find that buyer perceptions of RFP response quality are significantly enhanced when 
novel solutions are included in a supplier’s RFP response. To be most effective, the present 
research suggests that suppliers should offer novel solutions in the RFP response, rather 
than in the pre-RFP phase. Doing so precludes competitors from responding to the novel 
solution, thereby enhancing the perceived quality of the supplier’s RFP. If a focal supplier 
discloses a novel solution to the buyer in the pre-RFP phase, it may lose its advantage if 
the solution is included as a requirement in the RFP. To illustrate, a supplier in the waste 
management case provided a novel solution in its RFP response that could save the buying 
organization money over time. By withholding this novel customer solution until the post-
RFP phase, the supplier gained an advantage over its competitors because no other 
competitors offered a similar solution in their RFP responses. A buying center member 
elaborated on how the novel solution distinguished the supplier: 
But this other vendor [Supplier 2] offered more services. And so some of 
those services, for example, weights, so that when you’re tipping dumpsters, 
you’re able to determine the exact weights of each tip. You can use that 
information to optimize your routes and determine if you’re tipping air or if 
you can cut your frequencies. And we currently don’t have that. And 
unfortunately, we didn’t write that in our RFP to begin with to require that. 
We did ask for collaborative processes and so this other company offered 
that as one possible thing. But because they offered that and the other 
company didn't, that was one of the things, in my opinion, that contributed 
to a wide gap in the [RFP responses]. 
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In this situation, Supplier 2 enjoyed an advantage by providing a novel solution –an 
advantage which would have likely been forgone had they disclosed it in the pre-RFP 
phase. Here, the focal supplier created an advantage by strategically disclosing a novel 
solution when their competitors were unable to respond. While their competitors may have 
been able to provide a similar solution, they were unaware and, as such, did not provide 
one. Based on these findings I formally propose: 
 
P5: A focal supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater use of 
novel solutions in its RFP response. 
 
3.4.11 Content: Consummate Solutions 
 
Consummate solutions are supplier offerings that go above and beyond what is required by 
the RFP. Recent research highlights the importance of providing such discretionary effort 
because it can enhance customer satisfaction (Kashyap and Murtha 2017). Somewhat 
surprisingly, I found that the majority of supplier RFP responses simply answered the 
questions as written (i.e., perfunctory compliance). This may be explained by the literature 
on obedience, which highlights individuals’ proclivity to simply follow directions (Blass 
1999) and, perhaps, even follow directions to the point of causing personal discomfort 
(Slater et al. 2006). What buyers really appreciated, however, were suppliers who provided 
solutions that went beyond the requirements in the RFP. For instance, in the waste 
management case, the buyer requested a weekly report as part of the service agreement. 
Two of the three suppliers responded that they could provide the report as requested. The 
third supplier chose to take a different approach. It offered a solution that went above and 
beyond what the RFP had requested. As one buying center member noted: 
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I think they [focal supplier] met requirements first, [they] answered the 
questions that were posed to them, and then they said, ‘And also, we can 
offer you this and also we can offer this…’ So that was sort of the other 
thing that stood out to me… it just seems clear that there were more 
resources that they have available than [the other suppliers]. 
 
In this case, the focal supplier offered both weekly reporting, as well as the ability to 
provide customized reports that buyers could generate themselves. In the general office 
software case, a buying center member mentioned the value added from a supplier who 
took a similar approach: 
I thought one thing that was helpful was [Supplier 4] provided an alternate 
proposal. The alternate proposal was pretty much take two steps back and 
think about your overall needs, not just your needs for these two systems. I 
actually, when [procurement manager] said there was an alternate proposal 
from [Supplier 4], I was like, “That’s weird,” but actually it was valuable in 
the overall thinking about what we were doing. No one else did that. 
 
Thus, suppliers who take the initiative and voluntarily go beyond the requirements of the 
RFP can increase the buyer’s quality perceptions of their RFP response. This approach 
appears beneficial for two reasons. First, when buyers barricade themselves, other suppliers 
are generally unaware of a focal supplier’s discretionary RFP response efforts. As a result, 
they are less likely to offer similar solutions in their own RFP responses, thus creating an 
advantage for the focal supplier. In addition, buyers view consummate solutions in terms 
of exceeding expectations (i.e., positive disconfirmation) (Anderson and Sullivan 1993; 
Oliver 1980), which signals that the potential supplier is likely to be a good partner. Since 
buyers have limited access to suppliers, they must use alternative methods to evaluate 
which suppliers will be good suppliers to work with, something they would have normally 
tried to do through face-to-face interaction. By withholding consummate solutions until the 
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post-RFP phase, suppliers can increase their chances of exceeding buyer expectations and, 
consequently, enhance their selection likelihood.  
 
P6: A focal supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater use of 
consummate solutions in its RFP response. 
 
3.4.12 Content: Reference Congruency 
 
A final important content piece of the supplier RFP response was reference congruency, 
which refers to the degree of similarity between the buying organization and the 
organizations provided as references in the supplier’s RFP response (Kumar, Peterson, and 
Leone 2013). This issue was first mentioned during my initial interview with the committee 
chair of the veterinary services RFP. She mentioned that one thing she wanted to see in the 
supplier RFP responses was references that were similar in size and scope to the buying 
organization. I later observed the reason for these intentions. It appeared that when 
suppliers provided references different in size and scope from the buying firm, buyers 
perceived this as an indication that the supplier may lack the adequate experience to service 
their needs. For instance, a buying team member for the networking hardware case 
commented: 
I'm pretty sure that [supplier 1] has worked with more organizations and 
they've got their product in more organizations of our size. That kind of 
thing. For [supplier 2], they kept going back to this one reference, this one 
example, ‘oh you can contact this group for this. You can contact the same 
group for this.’ I'm trying to remember it was some kind of institute or 
whatever. It wasn't a public organization like we were. It was something 
else. That jumped out at me too. We definitely need a vendor that has more 
experience working with large public organizations. 
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This theme was common across buying center meetings. For instance, a member of the 
buying center for the general office software case mentioned: 
 
One thing I noticed is that [Supplier 1] provided a reference for [Public 
Organization 1] which is small compared to us, [Supplier 2] gave [Public 
Organization 2] as a reference, which feels more like us. 
 
References that were more prominent and/or prestigious than the buying organization often 
triggered fears of supplier inattentiveness to the buyer’s account. For instance, the IT 
manager buying center member for a network hardware case expressed his concerns thusly: 
 
I feel that [Supplier 1] and [Supplier 2] aren’t focused on this [project]. For 
example, [Supplier 2] gave [very prestigious organization] as a reference. 
So if [very prestigious organization] calls, I feel we would get bumped to 
the bottom of the queue. I think we’d be a small fish in a large pond with 
[Supplier 1] and [Supplier 2]. 
 
It is clear that the references suppliers include in their RFP responses convey important 
information to buyers (whether the references are contacted or not). The findings of the 
present research reinforce recent research suggesting that congruent references are more 
valuable than non-congruent references (Hada, Grewal, and Lilien 2014) and that 
incongruent references engender negative buyer perceptions (Johnson, Friend, and Malshe 
2016). The present research suggests that reference congruency may be particularly 
important in barricaded buying environments. When buyers are barricaded, they rely 
heavily on the references suppliers provide to get a sense of supplier capabilities. Thus, in 
barricaded environments, it becomes even more important for suppliers to include 
congruent references in their RFP responses because they may not get the opportunity to 
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amend buyer perceptions, or to respond to the negative inferences buyers make about the 
supplier as a result of incongruent references. 
 
P7: A focal supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater reference 
congruency in its RFP response. 
 
3.4.13 Delivery: Tone  
 
Tone refers to the buyer’s perception of the supplier’s attitude conveyed in its RFP 
response. The tone of suppliers’ responses is an important factor in the buying team’s 
decision-making. As one buying center member in the networking hardware case noted: 
 
Someone who didn't provide a good RFP response was [Supplier 1]. 
[Supplier 1’s] response was pretty much abysmal. They seemed mad in their 
response. 
 
In the general office software case, supplier tone was brought up immediately during the 
initial meeting to evaluate supplier RFP responses. A buying center member’s reaction to 
the negatively toned response was as follows: 
 
[Supplier 2] is eliminated in my mind… they came across as really arrogant 
in their RFP [response]. For example, for our question about bankruptcy 
they just put “we’re not going to answer that.” What type of response is 
that? [see actual RFP response, below] 
 
This reaction was echoed by several other members of the committee. Following the 
meeting, I identified RFP responses that buyers indicated as having different tones. The 
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following is a comparison of responses to the RFP question, “Explain the consequences for 
the organization should the offeror be sold or go out of business?” 
 
Positively perceived supplier tone: 
While there are no plans for a sale of the company and [Supplier 1] is in a 
very strong and well capitalized financial position to mitigate the risk of 
going out of business, our contracts are written such that product support 
and hosting would be provided to the customer for as long as the current 
term of the contract. 
 
Negatively perceived supplier tone: 
[Supplier 2] does not engage in this speculation. 
 
In barricaded buyer settings, suppliers must be careful in the way they write their RFPs. 
Answers that come across as short or negative are interpreted by buyers as evidence the 
supplier is not fully engaged in the buying process. Unfortunately, the barricade allows few 
opportunities to change the negative impressions buyers form as a result of poorly 
perceived tone. 
 
The importance of tone in the present research aligns well with existing communications 
research. When individuals receive written messages, they often use perceived tone in 
evaluating the intended meaning of the message sender (Byron 2008). More importantly 
for the present research context, individuals respond more favorably to written messages 
perceived as having a positive tone (Butts, Becker, and Bowell 2015). Since barricaded 
buyers rely heavily on the written word in RFPs to evaluate suppliers, it makes sense that 
RFP tone is likely to impact RFP response quality. Based on this discussion I propose the 
following: 
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P8: A focal supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater use of 
positive tone in its RFP response. 
 
3.4.14 Delivery: Explicitness  
 
In addition to tone, the importance of RFP explicitness was commonly alluded to during 
the post-RFP selection phase. RFP explicitness refers to the degree to which buyers have a 
clear understanding of what the supplier is offering in its RFP responses. Buying center 
members noted different aspects of suppliers’ RFP responses when determining how 
explicit they were. In the commercial printing case, for example, one supplier provided a 
tri-fold brochure as a sample of its print capabilities. However, the committee was most 
interested in the supplier’s ability to print large signs, which was not clear from the tri-fold 
sample. The inclusion of clarifying visuals, such as screenshots for software, detailed 
descriptions of processes, and clearly formatted responses to RFP specifications enhance 
the explicitness of suppliers’ responses. A manager involved in the waste management RFP 
provided his insights accordingly: 
The biggest differences [between proposals] were both the content, and sort 
of the formatting, and actual language used. Yeah. [Supplier 1] works 
differently – it’s much more clear, and descriptive, and detailed, again, 
much more concrete in the way that they provide service, they do pickups, 
where they’re taking them, how it’s processed once they get there, what 
they do in case of emergencies and delays. And I mean, we had org. charts 
to look at and route maps to look at, and as small as that might-- as petty as 
that may sound, it makes the details that much more clear. 
 
An IT manager in the specialized software case offered similar sentiments: 
I do think that the quality of the RFP, not necessarily what they’re willing 
to offer, but the quality of how the look and feel of the RFP, the narrative 
really helps make the decision I think. The ones that were hard to follow 
and understand, were messy, were the ones that ended up on the bottom of 
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my list...I couldn’t get a true sense at what they were trying to say in the 
RFP. Whereas those that were laid out with tables and examples and 
formatted nicely were the ones that rose to the top because I could clearly 
see and understand what they were trying to say in the narrative. 
 
The following responses to the question in the waste management RFP, “Please explain 
how your company provides accurate and timely reporting,” further illustrate the difference 
between more and less explicit responses by suppliers: 
More explicit RFP response: 
[Supplier] has numerous automated reporting options to choose from that 
can be utilized to meet [buyer’s] needs. The first option is through the Web 
Based Customer Portal reporting system. Through this option, [buyer] can 
retrieve, at their convenience, detailed data reports that can be downloaded 
into Excel or full image to PDF… 
 
Less explicit RFP response:  
We will provide any and all requested information from [buyer]. 
 
As highlighted by the previous examples, explicit RFP responses are easier for buyers to 
evaluate. Explicit responses positively affect buyer impressions of the supplier because 
they instill confidence in the supplier’s abilities and make clear what is offered. The 
information processing and decision-making literature reinforce the importance of 
explicitness. For instance, prior research suggests that information that is easy to 
understand results in more favorable product evaluations (Anand and Sternthal 1990; Hong 
and Sternthal 2010). Moreover, when information is difficult to process, individuals may 
switch preferences (Johnson, Payne, and Bettman 1988). When buyers are unbarricaded, 
less explicit RFP responses may be remedied through additional discussion and 
clarification. Barricaded buyers, in contrast, do not have this luxury and, as such, must 
interpret supplier responses on their own. As a result, the greater the level of explicitness, 
the greater are buyer perceptions of RFP quality. Thus, I propose: 
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P9: A focal supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater explicitness 
in its RFP response. 
 
3.4.15 Delivery: Tailoring 
 
Another common theme pervading discussions with and among buying team members 
about RFP delivery was the perceived level of tailoring in suppliers’ RFP responses. RFP 
response tailoring refers to the degree to which buyers feel an RFP response is customized 
to their organization. When suppliers submit highly tailored RFP responses, buyers view 
these suppliers as more committed to the purchase and the buying organization. In contrast, 
buying center members often objected to “canned” responses as they seemed generic and 
unhelpful (also see Johnson, Friend, and Malshe 2016). As a consequence, buyers question 
how well the supplier knows their account, and perceive the supplier as lazy and indifferent 
about winning the business. A manager in the network hardware case elaborated: 
You take [Supplier 4] for instance… they did a lot of copying and pasting. 
When they don’t know some of the nuances, that’s kind of a warning...In 
the case of the [Supplier 4] response, you get stuff where they literally, it’s 
like they didn't read the RFP, they were just doing cutting and pasting. 
 
To illustrate further, consider a particular section of the RFP for the network hardware case 
which stated, “These are the general areas of activity for which the [buyer] may seek 
assistance for the networking services provider to administer for the [buyer]. These areas 
are described in Section 7.0. Describe in narrative form how your firm will perform the 
proposed services.” The following responses from two different suppliers demonstrate 
differences in tailoring. 
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Highly tailored response: 
In regards to Financing and Leasing, the [Buyer] has an executed Master 
Lease Agreement with [Supplier 1], which will be the basis for any lease or 
financing transaction resulting from this RFP. We look forward to working 
closely with the [Buyer] to meet your leasing and financing needs. As 
required in Section 4.6.2, [Supplier 1] will offer a Tax-Exempt Lease 
Purchase for a financing period of 60 months with a $1.00 buyout at the end 
of the five year term. Per the answers to the submitted questions, [Supplier 
1] will provide 3, 4, or 5 annual payments based on [Buyer]’s preferences. 
Given there is not a specific configuration and quote being offered, 
[Supplier 1] anticipates providing a 0% interest rate, but that is subject to 
specific quotes generated as a result of this RFP. 
 
Poorly tailored response:  
[Supplier 2] is offering Procurement and Lease Services. 
 
As noted in the highly tailored response, the supplier mentions the buyer by name and also 
references questions that came up in the pre-RFP phase of the buying process. 
Alternatively, Supplier 2 does not mention any specific information about the buyer or this 
particular purchase. 
 
In concert with the results of the present research, prior research suggests that tailoring 
messages enhances the receivers’ perceptions of the sender (Godfrey, Seiders, and Voss 
2011; Johnson, Friend, and Malshe 2016; Song and Zinkhan 2008). These enhanced 
perceptions result from the receiver’s appreciation of the sender’s effort to tailor, which 
they may reciprocate by increasing their purchase intentions (Godfrey, Seiders, and Voss 
2011). As mentioned, barricaded buyers often rely heavily on the written RFP responses to 
develop supplier perceptions. If buyers perceive a lack of effort or interest stemming from 
a poorly tailored RFP response, there are few opportunities for suppliers to overcome this 
issue. Thus, tailored RFP responses become particularly important when buyers barricade 
themselves in the post-RFP phase. As a result of my findings I propose the following: 
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P10: A focal supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater tailoring 
of its RFP response. 
 
3.5 Discussion 
 
Dealing with barricaded buyers is common for suppliers doing business in the public 
sector, and is increasingly common within the private sector. The purpose of this research 
was to explore the barricaded buying environment in order to begin answering the question, 
“How can suppliers sell to buyers they have limited access to?” An examination of eight 
organizational purchases in the public sector provides significant insights into how 
suppliers can affect buying outcomes when selling to these barricaded buyers. The results 
of my research suggest that while suppliers may be restricted from accessing buyers 
directly, they may nevertheless have a significant opportunity to influence the buying 
process in their favor. This occurs with the caveat that suppliers must be strategic about the 
information they provide to buyers because it affects both competition and buyer 
perceptions. Below, I provide implications for theory and practice, discuss the limitations 
of the present research, and offer future research directions. 
 
3.5.1 Theoretical Implications 
 
Despite its pervasiveness in practice, research has been noticeably absent on the topic of 
buyers who limit access to suppliers during the sales cycle. As such, we advance the 
literature by introducing and examining the notion of barricaded buyers. In doing so, I 
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complement research on “gatekeeping” by highlighting the incidence and importance of 
impersonal, policy barricades. In addition, I begin to shed light on the underdeveloped area 
of business-to-government (B2G) selling (see Lilien 2016) and, relatedly, on requests for 
proposals (RFPs). Although academic examinations of B2G settings and RFPs are scarce 
(see Johnson, Friend, and Malshe 2016), existing RFP research tends to ignore important 
RFP content factors (e.g., novel and consummate solutions) and to focus on objective 
factors, such as price and delivery terms (Crow et al. 1980; Vyas and Woodside 1984). The 
present research, in contrast, points to the importance of subjective factors, such as how 
content is delivered in the RFP responses (e.g., tone, explicitness, and tailoring). Making 
positive impressions through these subjective factors is particularly important in barricaded 
buyer settings because suppliers have limited opportunities to overcome negative 
perceptions. Thus, the present research also moves the literature on RFPs beyond its 
traditional focus on objective factors to one that also incorporates buyers’ subjective 
evaluations. 
 
Our research also highlights the importance of strategic information disclosure (i.e., the 
thoughtfulness and timeliness with which a focal supplier provides information to buyers) 
when selling to barricaded buyers. Prior research implicitly assumes that information 
exchange between buyers and suppliers tends to be beneficial across all phases of the sales 
cycle (MacDonald et al. 2016; Moriarty and Spekman 1984). However, the present 
research suggests that it is important to know when to convey what types of information in 
barricaded buying environments.  
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For instance, the present research lends some nuance to when a supplier should 
communicate different types of solution information to a prospective buyer (e.g., Tuli, 
Kohli, and Bharadwaj 2007). I suggest that in the pre-RFP phase, supplier’s should identify 
solutions that highlight their unique capabilities, while withholding novel and consummate 
solutions that may not reflect their unique capabilities until the post-RFP phase. Thus, the 
present research takes a first step in understanding how suppliers can use buyer barricades 
to their advantage, which, until now, has remained largely unexamined. 
 
In addition, to the best of my knowledge, I am the first to integrate elements of competitive 
dynamics (e.g., competitor motivation and capability) from the firm level (e.g., Chen 1996; 
Chen, Tsu, and Tsai 2007; Smith, Ferrier, Ndofor 2001) to the transaction level. Thus, I 
advance extant views that tend to focus on interactions between one buyer (or buying firm) 
and one seller (or selling firm) (e.g., Hall, Ahearne, and Sujan 2015; Homburg, Müller, and 
Klarmann 2011; Mullins et al. 2014) to a view of selling that incorporates competitive 
dynamics among multiple sellers vying for a buyer’s business. Doing so leads to the 
introduction of new variables such as peacocking, which show how suppliers can 
demotivate their competitors. As such, I provide evidence that examinations of salesperson 
performance should consider including variables that incorporate a salesperson’s impact 
on the competition (e.g., peacocking, instilling unique language) in addition to traditional 
selling variables that directly affect customers (e.g., adaptive selling). 
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3.5.2 Managerial Implications 
 
The results of my research have implications for suppliers who sell to barricaded buyers. 
Although suppliers could find it frustrating to be restricted from buyers in barricaded 
settings, my research suggests they can use the barricade strategically to increase their 
likelihood of selection. In particular, suppliers should be mindful about when to share what 
information, and how to deliver it. 
 
In the pre-RFP phase, competitors often have the ability to respond to a supplier’s 
competitive actions. As such, suppliers should attempt to elicit customer needs they are 
uniquely capable of addressing and offer solutions they are uniquely capable of providing. 
In addition, suppliers should seek opportunities to inject their firm’s idiosyncratic 
terminology into their discussions with buyers. Doing so develops a common language 
with the buyer, which may result in its inclusion in the formal RFP. Suppliers should also 
consider opportunities to “peacock” to their competitors by announcing their tight 
connections and relationships to the buyer. Adopting these strategies can undermine the 
ability and motivation of competitors to respond to the RFP, thereby enhancing a supplier’s 
selection likelihood. 
 
In the post-RFP phase, competitors are less capable of responding to a focal supplier’s RFP 
response. Thus, suppliers have the opportunity to distinguish themselves by providing a 
high quality RFP. The present research provides insight into what constitutes a high quality 
RFP. First, suppliers should resist the urge to share a novel and consummate solutions prior 
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to submitting them in their RFP response. Doing so can help prevent a competitor from 
offering the same or better version of the solution to the buyer, thereby negating the 
supplier’s opportunity to differentiate itself. Along these lines, suppliers need to resist the 
urge to answer RFP questions in kind. Rather, the present research suggests that thinking 
outside the box (i.e., novel solutions) and providing solutions and ideas that go beyond 
what is expected (consummate solutions) provide positive signals to buyers. 
 
Our research suggests that suppliers should also provide references that are similar to the 
prospective buyer (e.g., in size, scope, and industry). Doing so signals they are more likely 
to understand the customer’s needs and can offer the appropriate solutions. These signals 
are important to buyers as they appear to take the place of information that buyers typically 
gather during face-to-face interactions with suppliers. 
 
Finally, my research suggests that buyers frequently rely on subjective factors in RFP 
responses when eliminating suppliers from consideration. I were surprised by the lack of 
attention to these factors by suppliers in my research, especially because buyers hinted they 
may be as, or more, important than objective factors (such as price) when selling to them. 
Thus, suppliers need to be conscientious about “soft” factors, such as the tone, explicitness, 
and tailoring of their RFP responses. 
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3.5.3 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
 
As with most research, the present research has its limitations. The present research was 
conducted within one large public organization. Although my findings reflect a diverse set 
of purchases, future research should examine other organizations and types of purchases. 
In addition, future research could provide additional insights by examining purchasing 
practices across different government levels (e.g., local, county, state, and federal). Also, 
although my focus was on barricaded buying in the public domain (Lilien 2016), future 
research should examine barricaded buying in the private sector (e.g., pharmaceuticals and 
financial services). 
 
The present research reflects a policy-based and impersonal barricade that suppliers 
frequently encounter in the government selling environment. As noted, however, there are 
other types of barricades that suppliers may face, such as gatekeepers, which affect buyer 
and supplier behaviors. As such, it would be beneficial to identify different types of 
barricades and how they might interplay to affect the buying process. Such an endeavor 
could provide valuable insights to sales managers and salespeople about the challenges 
they face in different industry contexts. 
 
Finally, like Tuli, Kohli, and Bharadwaj (2007), I do not integrate variables customarily 
associated with sales performance such as trust, adaptive selling, or customer orientation 
(Franke and Park 2006; Spiro and Weitz 1990) into my framework. Rather, my focus was 
on variables that emerged from my research and on those that are less frequently discussed 
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in the literature. Future researchers, therefore, should integrate these important variables 
into their studies to ensure the veracity of those proposed here. 
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3.6 Tables and Figures 
Table 3-1: Barricaded Buying Language in State and Federal Purchasing Policies 
 
Municipality Timing of 
Barricade 
Policy Language 
 
Source 
Federal Post-RFP *General information about agency mission needs and future 
requirements may be disclosed at any time. After release of 
the solicitation, the contracting officer must be the focal 
point of any exchange with potential offerors. When 
specific information about a proposed acquisition that would 
be necessary for the preparation of proposals is disclosed to 
one or more potential offerors, that information must be 
made available to the public as soon as practicable, but no 
later than the next general release of information, in order to 
avoid creating an unfair competitive advantage. 
State 
Procurement 
Code Manual, 
Section 
15.200(f)  
Alabama  Post-RFP From the issue date of this Solicitation until a Contractor is 
selected and a contract award is made, Respondents are not 
allowed to communicate about the subject of the RFP with 
any [Organization Employees] except: 
• The Purchasing Department representative, any University 
Purchasing Officer representing the organization, or others 
authorized in writing by the Purchasing Office and and 
organization representatives during Respondent 
presentations.  
State RFP 
Section 5.13 
Alaska  None No mention   
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Arizona  Pre and Post RFP Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 38-503 through 38-505, 41-741, 
41-753, 41-2503, and 41-2517 imposes certain restrictions on 
communications between an agency and an offeror/bidder 
during the procurement process. An offeror/bidder is 
restricted from making contacts from the date of the earliest 
notice of intent to solicit offers/bids through the date of the 
final award, and, one year after award with the successful 
contractors. The interval between these points is known as 
the “restricted period.” Certain exceptions to this restriction 
are set forth in the Arizona Procurement Code. 
Arizona 
Procurement 
Code Section 3.6 
Arkansas  Post-RFP Prior to any contract award, address all communication 
concerning this Bid Solicitation through OSP (Office of State 
Procurement) 
State RFP 
Section 1.17 (A) 
California  Post-RFP All questions must be submitted in writing to the individual 
listed on the RFP. 
State RFP 
Template 
Colorado  Post-RFP The Purchasing Agent shall coordinate the offerors' 
responses for review by the evaluation team. The Purchasing 
Agent shall be the SOLE point of contact throughout the 
process for all offerors. 
State RFP 
#99439321 
Section IV (A) 
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Connecticut  Post-RFP Communication with Potential Bidders: All communications 
with 
potential bidders regarding the RFP or the RFQ shall be in 
writing and shall be conducted through the Procurement 
Services Department. Members of the selection committee 
(see subsection 4 below) shall not have direct communication 
with bidders relating in any manner to the RFP or the RFQ. 
A pre-bid conference may be convened by the agency if 
deemed to be in its best interest. 
State 
Procurement 
Manual Section 
K-4 
Delaware  Post-RFP All requests, questions, or other communications about this 
RFP shall be made in writing to the State of Delaware. 
Address all communications to the person listed below; 
communications made to other State of Delaware personnel 
or attempting to ask questions by phone or in person will not 
be allowed or recognized as valid and may disqualify the 
vendor. Vendors should rely only on written statements 
issued by the RFP designated contact. 
State RFP 
Section IV (4) 
District of 
Columbia 
(DC) 
Post-RFP Exchanges with offerors after receipt of proposals are 
allowed. These may take the form of clarifications, 
communications, or discussions. Exchanges shall take place 
as part of the formal selection process and only with the 
Authority representative who is specifically identified to 
receive or transmit information. 
DC Water 
Authority 
Procurement 
Manual Chapter 
7.4.3.2 
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Florida  Post-RFP *Stage Four of the Public Procurement Process is the 
Solicitation process. The purpose of this Stage is to publicly 
release the competitive solicitation to the vendor 
community and collect responses that are submitted by the 
date and time listed in the solicitation Timeline of Events. 
During stage four, the Procurement Officer will serve as the 
sole point of contact for the solicitation. 
State 
Procurement 
Manual, Section 
4.1 - 
Introduction to 
the Solicitation 
Process 
Georgia  Post-RFP From the issue date of the solicitation and until a supplier is 
selected for contract award and the selection is made public, 
suppliers are not allowed to communicate for any reason with 
any state staff regarding the solicitation except through the 
issuing officer (or his/her designee) named in the solicitation. 
Prohibited communication includes all contact or interaction, 
including but not limited to telephonic communications, 
emails, faxes, letters, or personal meetings, such as lunch, 
entertainment, or otherwise. 
State 
Procurement 
Manual, Section 
4.4.2. - 
Restrictions on 
Communications 
Hawaii  Post-RFP 1.6 RFP Point-of-Contact 
From the release date of this RFP until the selection of the 
successful provider(s), any inquiries and requests shall be 
directed to the sole point-of-contact identified below. 
State RFP 
Section 1.6 
Idaho  Post-RFP If an evaluator is contacted by a proposer or other interested 
party, the evaluator may not discuss anything related to the 
RFP, the process, or the proposal(s), and must direct the 
individual to DOP. 
State 
Procurement 
Manual P. 29 
Illinois Post-RFP* The sole point of contact in this Commonwealth for this RFP 
shall be the Issuing Officer [procurement officer]. 
State RFP 
Template 
Indiana  Post-RFP Inquiries are not to be directed to any staff member of FSSA, 
or any other participating agency. Such action may disqualify 
Respondent from further consideration for a contract 
resulting from this RFP. 
State RFP 
Section 1.7 
   
 
 
9
4
 
Iowa  Post-RFP During the publication period, prospective respondents may 
not contact the issuing PA in person or by phone. However, 
vendors may contact the PA via email. The PA posts all 
responses to email inquiries on the Bid Opportunities website 
such that all prospective vendors receive consistent 
information and no vendor receives information not provided 
to all vendors. 
State 
Procurement 
Manual Pg. 24 
Kansas  Post-RFP The Bid Event ID / RFP number, indicated in the header of 
this page, as well as on the first page of this proposal, has 
been assigned to this RFP and MUST be shown on all 
correspondence or other documents associated with this RFP 
and MUST be referred to in all verbal communications.  All 
inquiries, written or verbal, shall be directed only to the 
procurement officer reflected on Page 1 of this proposal.  
There shall be no communication with any other State 
employee regarding this RFP except with designated state 
participants in attendance ONLY DURING: 
 
• Negotiations 
• Contract Signing 
• as otherwise specified in this RFP. 
 
Violations of this provision by bidder or state agency 
personnel may result in the rejection of the proposal. 
State RFP 
Section 1.1 
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Kentucky  Post-RFP Communications with Vendors: In order to ensure fair and 
equitable treatment of all vendors, communication regarding 
a particular procurement shall cease at an appropriate date 
prior to the issuance of a Solicitation. Questions regarding 
the Solicitation, once issued, shall be submitted in 
accordance with the directions in the Solicitation. 
KY FAP 110-10-
00 #27 
Louisiana  Post-RFP It may be advantageous to have a period of inquiry on a 
solicitation prior to opening bids to answer bidder questions 
and clarify specifications. If an inquiry is in order, include 
language in the solicitation.  
Example: 
This solicitation includes a period of inquiry. No decisions or 
actions shall be executed by any bidder as a result of any oral 
discussions with any State employee, or State consultant. 
Only those transactions which are in writing may be 
considered as valid. Likewise, the State will only consider 
communications from bidders that are signed and in writing. 
Louisiana 
Procurement 
Handbook 
Section 11 
Maine  Post-RFP From the time this RFP is issued until award notification is 
made, all contact with the State regarding this RFP must be 
made through the aforementioned RFP Coordinator.  No 
other person/ State employee is empowered to make binding 
statements regarding this RFP.  Violation of this provision 
may lead to disqualification from the bidding process, at the 
State’s discretion. 
State RFP Part I 
Provision B (1) 
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Maryland  Post-RFP Procurement Officer – The State representative for this 
Contract who is, prior to the award of any Contract, the sole 
point of contact in the State for purposes of this solicitation. 
After Contract award, the Procurement Officer has 
responsibilities as detailed in the Contract (Attachment A), 
and is the only State representative who can authorize 
changes to the Contract. The Department may change the 
Procurement Officer at any time by written notice to the 
Contractor. 
State RFP 
Section 1.2 
Massachusetts  Post-RFP Respondents are prohibited from communicating directly 
with any employee of the [Organization] except as specified 
in this RFP, and no other individual Commonwealth 
employee or representative is authorized to provide any 
information or respond to any questions or inquiries 
concerning this RFP. 
State RFP 
Section 6.1 (f) 
Michigan  Post-RFP Once the solicitation is published, communication with 
vendors regarding the content of the solicitation must be 
limited. Strict State and vendor communication protocol is 
essential to ensure a fair and competitive purchasing 
environment. State and vendor communication protocol is as 
follows: The Solicitation Manager is the individual 
responsible for leading and facilitating all aspects of the 
solicitation process through contract award, and will serve as 
the point of contact for potential vendors during this period. 
Once the solicitation is released, all communication with 
vendors must be through only the Solicitation anager.  
State 
Procurement 
Manual - Section 
7.3 
Minnesota  Post-RFP Other personnel are NOT authorized to discuss this request 
for proposal with responders, before the proposal submission 
deadline. Contact regarding this RFP with any personnel not 
listed above could result in disqualification. 
State RFP p. 4 
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Mississippi  Post-RFP Communications with State 
From the issue date of this RFP until a Vendor is selected 
and the selection is announced, responding Vendors or their 
representatives may not communicate, either orally or in 
writing regarding this RFP with any statewide elected 
official, state officer or employee, member of the legislature 
or legislative employee except as noted herein. To ensure 
equal treatment for each responding Vendor, all questions 
regarding this RFP must be submitted in writing to the 
State’s contact person for the selection process, and not later 
than the last date for accepting responding Vendor questions 
provided in this RFP. 
State RFP 
Section 13 
Missouri  Post-RFP Questions Regarding the RFP – Except as may be otherwise 
stated herein, the offeror and the offeror’s agents (including 
subcontractors, employees, consultants, or anyone else acting 
on their behalf) must direct all of their questions or 
comments regarding the RFP, the solicitation process, the 
evaluation, etc., to the buyer of record [Procurement 
Manager] indicated on the first page of this RFP. 
Inappropriate contacts to other personnel are grounds for 
suspension and/or exclusion from specific procurements. 
Offerors and their agents who have questions regarding this 
matter should contact the buyer. 
State RFP 
Section 3.1.4 
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Montana Post-RFP Single Point of Contact. The purpose of naming one contact 
person, usually the procurement officer who issues the RFP, 
is to: 
ü Ensure that all questions will be routed through one person; 
ü Provide the same information to all offerors; 
ü Eliminate confusion (“Well, someone else said I could do it 
this way”); 
ü Inform potential offerors that they may not contact 
members of the evaluation committee or agency staff; 
ü eMACS provides the procurement officer’s name and 
contact information. 
State 
Procurement 
Manual pg. 23 
Nebraska  Post-RFP From the date the RFP is issued until the Intent to Award is 
issued communication from the Bidder is limited to the POC 
listed above.  After the Intent to Award is issued the Bidder 
may communicate with individuals the State has designated 
as responsible for negotiating the contract on behalf of the 
State.  
State RFP 
Section I (B) 
Nevada  Post-RFP 9.1.7 For purposes of addressing questions concerning this 
RFP, the sole contact will be the Purchasing Division as 
specified on Page 1 of this RFP.  Upon issuance of this RFP, 
other employees and representatives of the agencies 
identified in the RFP will not answer questions or otherwise 
discuss the contents of this RFP with any prospective 
vendors or their representatives.  Failure to observe this 
restriction may result in disqualification of any subsequent 
proposal per NAC 333.155(3).  This restriction does not 
preclude discussions between affected parties for the purpose 
of conducting business unrelated to this procurement. 
State RFP 
Section 9.1.7 
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New 
Hampshire  
Post-RFP Any questions, clarifications, and/or requested changes shall 
be submitted by an individual authorized to commit their 
organization to the Terms and Conditions of this bid and 
shall be received in writing at the Bureau of Purchase and 
Property no later than 4:00 PM on the date listed in the 
timeline below. Questions shall not be submitted to anyone 
other than the Purchasing Agent or his/her representative. 
Bidders that submit questions verbally or in writing to any 
other State entity or State personnel shall be found in 
violation of this part and may be found non-compliant. 
State RFP pg. 2 
New Jersey  Post-RFP From the moment a procurement process begins, with notice 
of a solicitation, to the moment it ends, with the final 
contract or award, vendors/contractors and their 
representatives may contact the Port Authority with respect 
to that procurement only via the Procurement Department 
individual or individuals explicitly designated for that 
purpose. Contact is limited to obtaining clarifications and not 
for the purpose of influencing selection. The complete 
contractor integrity provisions can be viewed on the Port 
Authority website. 
NJ Port 
Authority Guide 
to Procurement 
p. 9 
New Mexico  Post-RFP Any inquiries or requests regarding this procurement should 
be submitted, in writing, to the Procurement Manager. 
Offerors may contact ONLY the Procurement Manager 
regarding this procurement. Other state employees or 
Evaluation Committee members do not have the authority to 
respond on behalf of the FMD. 
State RFP 
Section I-D (3) 
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New York  Post-RFP *State Finance Law §§139-j and 139-k impose certain 
restrictions on communications between an agency and an 
offerer/bidder during the procurement process. An 
offerer/bidder is restricted from making “contacts” (defined 
in the law as communications intended to influence the 
procurement) from the date of the earliest notice of intent to 
solicit offers/bids through the 
date of the final award, and, if applicable, approval of the 
contract by the Office of the State Comptroller, to other than 
designated staff (as identified by the agency). The interval 
between these points is known as the “restricted period.” 
Certain exceptions to this restriction are set 
forth in State Finance Law §139-j (3) (a). An example of an 
exception would be communication during contract 
negotiations. 
State 
Procurement 
Manual - Section 
III Guidelines 
for Solicitations, 
Section F 
North 
Carolina  
Post-RFP During the period of evaluation and prior to award, only the 
information provided in the tabulation is public record. 
Possession of offers, including any accompanying 
information submitted with the offers, shall be limited to 
persons in the agency who are responsible for processing and 
evaluating the offers and accompanying information. Vendor 
participation in the evaluation process shall not be permitted. 
State 
Procurement 
Manual - Section 
5.3 
North Dakota  Post-RFP The procurement officer is the point of contact for this RFP.  
All vendor communications regarding this RFP must be 
directed to the procurement officer.  Unauthorized contact 
regarding the RFP with other State employees of the 
purchasing agency may result in the vendor being 
disqualified, and the vendor may also be suspended or 
disbarred from the state bidders list. 
State RFP 
Section 1.02 
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Ohio  Post-RFP During the evaluation phase, offerors may not initiate any 
communication with the evaluation team. 
State 
Procurement 
Manual - Section 
5.3.4 
Oklahoma  Post-RFP Limited contact. The State Purchasing Director may limit 
contact regarding a solicitation between suppliers and agency 
personnel during the solicitation process. The limitation of 
contact may be described in the solicitation. All 
communication between suppliers and agency personnel 
regarding a solicitation shall be documented and submitted to 
DCS for inclusion in the bid file. 
Oklahoma 
Central 
Purchasing Rules 
Chapter 15, 
580:15-2-7C  
Oregon  Post-RFP SINGLE POINT OF CONTACT (SPC) 
The SPC for this RFP is identified on the Cover Page, along 
with the SPC’s contact information.  Proposer shall direct all 
communications related to any provision of the RFP only to 
the SPC, whether about the technical requirements of the 
RFP, contractual requirements, the RFP process, or any other 
provision. 
State RFP 
Section 1.3 
Pennsylvania Pre and Post RFP+ SOLICITATION CONTACT: The individual listed below 
shall be the single point of contact for this solicitation. 
Unless otherwise directed, Offerors should only 
communicate with the Solicitation Contact. The 
State/Agency/University shall not be held responsible for 
information provided to any other person.  
State RFP 
Template 
Rhode Island  Post-RFP Questions concerning this solicitation must be e-mailed to 
the Division of Purchases at [….@purchasing.ri.gov] no later 
than the date and time indicated on page one of this 
solicitation. No other contact with State parties is permitted. 
State RFP 
Section 6 
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South 
Carolina  
Post-RFP Prior to the issuance of an award or notification of intent to 
award, whichever is earlier, state personnel involved in an 
acquisition shall not engage in conduct that knowingly 
furnishes source selection information to anyone other than 
the responsible procurement officer, unless otherwise 
authorized in writing by the responsible procurement officer.   
State Code 
R445.2010(B) 
South Dakota  Post-RFP Offeror's Contacts: Offerors and their agents (including 
subcontractors, employees, consultants, or anyone else acting 
on their behalf) must direct all of their questions or 
comments regarding the RFP, the evaluation, etc. to the 
buyer of record indicated on the first page of this RFP. 
Offerors and their agents may not contact any state employee 
other than the buyer of record regarding any of these matters 
during the solicitation and evaluation process. Inappropriate 
contacts are grounds for suspension and/or exclusion from 
specific procurements. Offerors and their agents who have 
questions regarding this matter should contact the buyer of 
record. 
South Dakota 
RFP Process 
Workgroup 
Report Section 
4.2 
Tennessee  Post-RFP Unauthorized contact about this RFP with employees, 
officials, or consultants of the State of Tennessee except as 
detailed below may result in disqualification from 
consideration under this procurement process. 
State RFP 
Section 1.4.2 
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Texas  Post-RFP All communication with potential respondents should be 
made only through the Purchasing Department or other 
designated staff. The program staff should not have contact 
with potential respondents outside of pre-solicitation 
conferences. Likewise, a respondent that contacts someone 
other than authorized staff in regards to a solicitation maybe 
disqualified. While the Purchasing Staff or other designated 
staff may not be able to answer all of the technical questions 
asked by potential respondents, they will ensure that the 
information is provided to all potential respondents. 
State Contract 
Management 
Guide, p. 71 
Utah  Post-RFP The conducting procurement unit shall ensure that each 
member of an evaluation committee and each individual 
participating in the evaluation committee process:  
does not contact or communicate with a vendor concerning 
the evaluation process or procurement outside the official 
evaluation committee process 
Utah State 
Procurement 
Code Section 
63G-6a-410, 
9.A.ii.c 
Vermont  Post-RFP 3.1 Single Point of Contact 
All communications concerning this RFP are to be addressed 
in writing to the State Contact listed on the front page of this 
RFP.  Actual or attempted contact with any other individual 
from the State concerning this RFP is strictly prohibited and 
may result in disqualification. 
Vermont Sample 
RFP Section 3.2 
Virginia  Post-RFP The evaluators should be instructed not to contact any of the 
offerors. They must also be instructed not to reveal any 
information or tentative conclusions on the relative merits of 
proposals. 
State 
Procurement 
Manual p. 159 
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Washington  Post-RFP The RFP Coordinator is the sole point of contact in OSOS 
for this procurement. All communication between the Bidder 
and OSOS upon receipt of this RFP shall be with the RFP 
Coordinator, Any other communication will be considered 
unofficial and non-binding. Bidders are to rely only upon 
written statements issued by the RFP Coordinator. 
Communication directed to parties other than the RFP 
Coordinator may result in disqualification of the Bidder. 
State RFP 
Section 2.1 
West Virginia  Post-RFP He or she [Committee members] has not had or will not have 
contact relating to the solicitation identified herein with any 
participating vendors between the time of the bid opening 
and the award recommendation without prior approval of the 
Purchasing Division. 
West Virginia 
Procurement 
Handbook 
Section 7.1.3 
Wisconsin  Post-RFP This Request for Proposal (RFP) is issued by the Wisconsin 
Department of [ ] which is the sole point of contact for the 
State of Wisconsin during the selection process.  The person 
responsible for managing the procurement process is [ ]. 
State RFP 
Section 1.3 
Wyoming NONE APPOINTMENTS WITH BUYERS AND AGENCIES 
Although every effort will be made to accommodate 
salesmen or representatives who arrive unannounced, it is 
preferred that appointments be made in advance. 
Buyers and agency personnel operate under substantial 
workloads and prior appointments will help assure full 
consideration be given to presentations or discussions. 
Wyoming 
Vendor's Guide 
p. 2 
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Table 3-2: Characteristics of Buying Center Cases 
 
 
Buying 
Project 
Product/ 
Service 
Buyclass 
Decisio
n 
Makers 
Supplier 
RFP 
Response
s 
Total 
Interview
s 
Average 
Intervie
w Length 
Total 
Intervie
w Hours 
Meeting
s 
Observe
d 
RFP 
Duratio
n 
(Months) 
1 Pest Control Service Rebuy 3 1 4 32 2.13 4 2 
2 General 
Office 
Software Product New 5 4 11 25 5.00 2 3 
3 Waste 
Management Service Rebuy 10 2 9 45 7.50 4 9 
4 Specialized 
Software  Product New  8 4 7 22 2.57 5 10 
5 Veterinary 
Services Service Rebuy 6 2 6 20 1.67 2 2 
6 Network 
Hardware Product New  6 8 8 22 2.93 2 2 
7 Transportatio
n Rental 
Services Service New  6 2 0 0 .00 2 4 
8 Commercial 
Printing Service Rebuy 5 6 1 20 .33 1 2 
 Totals   49 29 46 23.25 17.83 22 4.25 
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Table 3-3: List of Propositions 
 
P1: A supplier can increase its selection likelihood by increasing buyer familiarity with its 
unique language during the pre-RFP phase. 
P2: A supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater focus on its unique 
capabilities during the pre-RFP phase. 
P3: A supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater use of relationship 
peacocking during the pre-RFP phase. 
P4: A supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater use of information 
peacocking during the pre-RFP phase. 
P5: A supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater use of novel solutions in 
its RFP response. 
P6: A supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater use of consummate 
solutions in its RFP response. 
P7: A supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater reference congruency in 
its RFP response. 
P8: A supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater use of positive tone in its 
RFP response. 
P9: A supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater explicitness in its RFP 
response. 
P10: A supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater tailoring of its RFP 
response. 
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Table 3-4: Pre-RFP Conference Language in State and Federal Purchasing Policies 
 
Municipality Pre-RFP Conference Language Source 
Federal 14.207 Pre-bid conference. 
A pre-bid conference may be used, generally in a complex 
acquisition, as a means of briefing prospective bidders and 
explaining complicated specifications and requirements to 
them as early as possible after the invitation has been issued. 
Section 14.2-6 (FAC 2005-
92) 
Alabama  A Pre-Proposal Conference / On-site visit will be held at 
[Organization], MARCH 1, 2018, at 1:30pm CST, to clarify 
the Organizations’s expectations to Respondents and to visit 
the site(s). All participants shall meet at GATE 1. 
Respondents whom meet the qualifications of this RFP and 
have intentions of submitting a full response shall participate 
in the pre-proposal conference and site tour. 
State RFP #T054715 
Alaska  If your agency plans to have a pre-solicitation conference, 
you should either tape record the proceedings for possible 
preparation of a transcript or keep accurate written notes. If 
your agency responds to substantive questions during the 
conference, you must reaffirm those answers in writing via an 
amendment after the conference and distribute the answers to 
all potential offerors. 
Alaska Procurement Manual 
Section AAM 81.110 
Arizona  Prior to the due date for bids, an agency may require site 
visits to ensure that bidders are aware of site conditions. The 
agency may also hold a pre-bid conference to allow bidders to 
ask questions and/or exchange information with agency staff. 
Arizona Procurement Manual 
Section 5.2.5 
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Arkansas  OSP will host a Pre-Proposal Conference session that is 
mandatory for all Vendors submitting Proposals. Vendors are 
encouraged to attend in person, however, a teleconference 
option is also available. Vendors will have the opportunity to 
gain further understanding of the RFP requirements, process 
and procedures. 
Arkans RFP SP-17-0006 
Section 2.1.2 
California  Prepare the Notice to Contractors, including the following 
notifications include… Date, time, and place of a pre-bid 
meeting and/or site inspection. Mandatory pre-bid meetings 
shall not occur fewer than five (5) calendar days after the first 
publication of the initial Notice to Bidders (PCC § 6610). 
Pg. 113-114 
Colorado  Pre-bid conferences may be conducted to explain the 
procurement requirements. They shall be announced on 
BIDS. The conference should be held long enough after the 
Invitation for Bid has been issued, to allow bidders to become 
familiar with it, but with adequate time before bid opening to 
allow bidders consideration of the conference results in 
preparing their bids. Nothing stated at the pre-bid conference 
shall change the Invitation for Bids unless a change is made 
by written amendment, posted on BIDS. 
State Procurement Manual 
Section R-24-103-202a-02 
Connecticut  See barricaded language State Procurement Manual 
Section K-4 
Delaware  Pre-bid conferences. — An agency may conduct a pre-bid 
conference within a reasonable time but not less than 7 days 
before a bid opening to explain the requirements of an 
invitation to bid. An agency may require mandatory 
attendance by bidders at such pre-bid conferences to qualify 
as a responsible and responsive bidder. Statements made at 
the pre-bid conference shall not be considered amendments to 
State Procurement Code § 
6923 (f) 
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the invitation to bid unless a written amendment is issued 
pursuant to subsection (g) of this section. 
District of Columbia (DC) Pre-proposal conferences are generally used in complex 
acquisitions as a means of briefing prospective offerors and 
explaining complicated specifications and requirements. 
Although various aspects of the RFP and the requirements 
may be discussed, a statement during the pre-proposal 
conference by itself shall not change the RFP. All changes to 
the RFP shall be issued through an amendment. 
DC Water Authority 
Procurement Manual Chapter 
7.3.3 
Florida  The Procurement Officer may host a Pre-Response 
Conference that will serve as the first opportunity for 
potential respondents to ask questions about the solicitation 
Section 4.1, pg. 63 
Georgia  Additional scheduled activities may include, but are not 
limited to, receiving and answering suppliers’ questions or 
conducting an offerors’ or pre-bid conference. 
Section 3.5.2 
Hawaii  Generally; At least 15 days prior to the submission of bids 
pursuant to §103D-302 for a construction or design-build 
project with a total estimated contract value of $500,000 or 
more, and at least 15 days prior to the submission of 
proposals pursuant to §103D-303 for a construction or design-
build project with a total estimated contract value of $100,000 
or more, the head of the purchasing agency shall hold a pre-b 
id conference and shall invite all potential interested bidders, 
offerors, subcontractors, and union representatives to attend. 
HRS §103D-303.5. 
State Procurement Manual 
Section V. 
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Idaho  The Pre-Bid or Pre-Proposal conference is conducted/led by 
DOP (DOP will introduce the procurement, have attendees 
introduce themselves, provide an overview of the solicitation 
process and highlight the mandatory (M) requirements of the 
solicitation). 
Chapter 8, pg. 22 
Illinois e. Notifies BSBO, in writing, of the pre-proposal conference 
date and offers BSBO the opportunity to participate. 
Part II, Ch 07 - pg. 3 
Indiana  Pre-RFP Informational Session 
In order to ensure that State agencies are developing RFPs 
that are reflective of the latest technology and processes and 
that the agency has input from local industry representatives, 
a pre-RFP informational session is required prior to the 
planned issuance of any RFP. In some cases, IDOA may 
determine a combined session of the pre-RFP informational 
session and the pre-proposal conference may best suit the 
process. This session is a great opportunity for Indiana 
certified minority and women businesses to identify prime 
bidders they may wish to partner with. 
https://www.in.gov/idoa/3110
.htm 
Iowa  Pre-Proposal Conference/Site Visit 
Some RFPs include a conference or site visit as specified in 
the solicitation documents prior to the due date for proposals. 
Occasionally, site visits are necessary or helpful to provide 
respondents with additional information. 
State Procurement Manual 
Pg. 28 
Kansas  RFP will typically involve a Pre-Bid Question & Answer 
Period or may include a Pre-Bid Conference if on-site 
discussions/tour are needed, 
• Allows potential vendors to request clarification of RFP 
information 
• Q&A released to all known interested vendors via 
addendum, posted to the Internet 
State Procurement Manual 
Pg. 10 
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Kentucky  3.8 Pre-Bid Conferences 
A pre-bid conference may be conducted to explain the 
procurement requirements for any particular procurement. 
The conference shall be open to the public, and the date, 
place and time of the conference shall be announced to all 
prospective bidders known to have received the invitation for 
bids, or a notice of availability of the invitation for bids. 
Kentucky Model Procurement 
Code 45A.360 
Louisiana  There are two types of prebid conferences – mandatory and 
non-mandatory. If the prebid conference is mandatory, only 
the companies represented by attendees may be considered 
for an award. A mandatory pre-bid conference must have 
compelling reasons and should be avoided wherever possible 
in an effort to increase competition. Note: State Purchasing 
requires all mandatory pre-bid conferences other than those 
substantiated by an architect’s letter on construction, to have 
management approval prior to bidding. 
Louisiana Procurement 
Handbook Section 10 
Maine   Pre-Bidders conferences are allowed, but are not required. 
These conferences are used to be certain that all bidders have 
an equal understanding of the state requirements. 
Chapter 110, Section II, A-IV 
Maryland  A Pre-Proposal Conference (the Conference) will be held at 
the date, time, and location indicated in the RFP Key 
Information Summary Sheet (near the beginning of the 
solicitation, after the Title Page and Notice to Vendors). 
All prospective Offerors are encouraged to attend in order to 
facilitate better preparation of their Proposals. 
State RFP Section 1.7 
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Massachusetts  You may hold a bidders’ or proposers’ conference to 
supplement the purchase description. A pre-bid or pre-
proposal conference may be necessary if, for example, 
vendors must examine a particular piece of equipment or 
inspect a facility that will be operated or managed under the 
contract you are awarding. However, a sufficiently detailed 
purchase description may make a conference unnecessary. 
You may choose to make the conference optional or 
mandatory. In either case, you should include notice of the 
conference in the purchase description, record all comments, 
questions, and answers at the conference, and distribute this 
record to all vendors in time for them to prepare their 
submittals. 
State Procurement Manual 
Chapter 2 p. 16 
Michigan  Use pre-bid and pre-proposal conferences for complex 
acquisitions, such as facility construction, or acquisitions that 
will likely receive a single bid, such as recent MDOT 
procurements for the MichiVan Program and intercity 
services. Conferences can be used as a means of briefing 
prospective offerors and explaining complicated 
specifications and requirements to them as early as possible 
after the solicitation has been issued and before offers are 
received. 
Pg. 29 
Minnesota  Pre-Bid Conference 
If a pre-bid conference is indicated, you are encouraged to 
attend as this is an open discussion of the bid documents. City 
staff and any other involved parties are available to answer 
any questions. 
Minneapolis Procurement 
Guide 
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Mississippi  Pre-bid conferences may be conducted to explain the 
procurement requirements. They must be announced to all 
prospective bidders known to have received an Invitation for 
Bids. The conference should be held long enough after the 
Invitation for Bids has been issued to allow bidders to become 
familiar with it but sufficiently before bid opening to allow 
bidders to make any adjustments based on clarifications made 
during the conference. 
State Procurement Manual 
Section 3.106.07 
Missouri  Occasionally, the nature and complexity of a particular 
solicitation will necessitate a conference with potential 
bidders prior to the submission of bids to ensure the clarity of 
the requirements. The specific date, time, and place of the 
pre-bid conference will be announced in the solicitation 
document. 
Missouri Procurement 
Manual Section 24 
Montana If desired, the State may conduct a face-to-face or conference 
call pre-proposal conference for potential offerors. This 
conference may either be mandatory or optional for the 
offerors to attend and must be stated as such in the RFP. 
Mandatory conferences should be used only when absolutely 
necessary. 
State Procurement Manual 
pg. 13 
Nebraska  A pre-bid conference is conducted to explain the procurement 
requirements to potential bidders and allow potential bidders 
to ask questions. Pre-Bid Conferences may be mandatory or 
optional at the discretion of the agency. Responses to 
questions during the Pre-Bid Conference are not binding on 
the State unless answered in writing, and posted to the SPB 
website. 
Section 6.3, pg. 50 
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Nevada  *Undefined in Procurement Manual but pre-bid conferences 
are common according to Nevada purchasing website. 
Nevada purchasing website 
http://www.clarkcountynv.go
v/administrative-
services/purchasing/Pages/list
ings.aspx 
New Hampshire  The RFP states a specific date and time deadline for proposal 
receipt and often has mandatory pre-proposal meetings for 
vendors to attend. This meeting offers the opportunity to ask 
questions and gives the University a chance to determine 
whether any changes need to be issued (addenda) to the RFP. 
This is also an excellent time to conduct any requisite site 
visits to familiarize vendors with the project site(s). 
New Hampshire University 
System Procurement 
Procedures Section 06-007 
New Jersey  § Will there be a pre-bid conference?  Where?  When? 
(State law does not permit mandatory attendance at a pre-bid 
conference.  The term “strongly encouraged” is advised. 
New Jersey Standard Bid 
Document Section C-I 
New Mexico  Prepare, conduct /attend Pre-Proposal Conference State Procurement Manual p. 
16 
New York  Prior to the due date for bids, an agency may require site 
visits to ensure that bidders are aware of site conditions. 
Pg. 24 
North Carolina  Conferences or site visits early in the solicitation cycle 
provide an opportunity to emphasize and clarify critical 
aspects of solicitations, eliminate ambiguities or 
misunderstandings, and permit vendor input. 
Section 2.1.C 
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North Dakota  PRE-PROPOSAL CONFERENCES:  Pre-proposal 
conferences may be conducted in accordance with 1.4.1.18 
NMAC of this rule. Any such conference should be held prior 
to submission of initial proposals. 
State Procurement Regulation 
1.4.1.33 
Ohio  Some bids include a pre-bid conference or site visit. Such 
events will be specified in the ITB. 
Section 5.2.1 
Oklahoma  Pre-bid conference. The State Purchasing Director shall state 
in a solicitation if the State Purchasing Director shall hold a 
supplier pre-bid conference and shall state whether supplier 
attendance is mandatory or non-mandatory. 
Oklahoma Central Purchasing 
Rules Chapter 15, 580:15-4-5 
(h)  
Oregon  Purpose. A Contracting Agency may hold pre-Offer 
conferences with prospective Offerors prior to Closing, to 
explain the Procurement requirements, obtain information, or 
to conduct site inspections. 
OAR 137-047-0420 
Pennsylvania A pre-bid conference may be conducted to enhance 
understanding of the procurement requirements. The pre-bid 
conference shall be announced as a part of the Invitation for 
Bids notice. The conference may be designated as "attendance 
mandatory" or "attendance optional". 
Title 44, Code 1, Subtitle A, 
Section C 
Rhode Island  *Pre-bid conference is not defined in the procurement 
manual, however pre-bid conferences are listed on the 
purchasing department website 
http://www.purchasing.ri.gov/
bidding/ExternalBidListing.as
px?Status=Active(Scheduled) 
South Carolina  PRE-BID CONFERENCES AND SITE VISITS – SC Code 
Ann Reg. 19-445.2042 
6.4.1 Agencies must advertise pre-bid conferences and site 
visits in SCBO. 
State Procurement Manual 
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6.4.2 The Agency should schedule the conference to occur no 
less than 14 days prior to bid opening. This will allow the 
Agency to clarify by addendum any issues bidders raise at the 
pre-bid conference 
South Dakota  Bidders Conference 
A meeting held with prospective bidders or offerors prior to 
submission of bids or proposals, to review, discuss and clarify 
technical considerations, specifications and standards 
associated with a proposed procurement. 
South Dakota Vendor Manual 
p. 6 
Tennessee  Pre-Bid/Proposal Conference/Question and Answer Period. If 
appropriate, a prebid/proposal conference and/or a question 
and answer period shall be included in the solicitation 
process. The purpose of the pre-bid/proposal conference and 
question and answer period is to provide prospective 
bidders/proposers the opportunity to submit 
questions/comments regarding the solicitation. 
Tennessee Procurement 
Manual Section 8.5.6 
Texas  Agenciesmayconductmandatoryornon-mandatorypre-
solicitationconferences. 
Page 69 
Utah  Mandatory pre-bid conferences and site visits may be held to 
explain the procurement requirements in accordance with the 
following… 
Utah Code R33-6-101 
Vermont  Pre-Bid (Bidders’) Conferences and Adjustments to Bid 
Documents 
RFPs for large or complex projects shall require a pre-bid 
meeting (conference). The purpose of the pre-bid meeting 
(conference) is for the State to have an opportunity to review 
the statement of work and other RFP documents with bidders 
to ensure the State and the Vendors fully understand the 
requirements of the RFP. 
Vermont Procurement 
Bulletin 3.5 Section VII-B-2-
6 
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Virginia  Pre-bid or Preproposal Conference: Meeting held with 
prospective bidders or offerors prior to submission of bids or 
proposals, to review, discuss, and clarify technical 
considerations, specifications, and standards relative to the 
proposed procurement. 
Virginia Procurement Code p. 
279 
Washington  Pre-bid conferences and site visits provide an opportunity for 
dialogue between the Purchasing Activity, its customers, and 
the vendor community. Both facilitate the timely exchange of 
information to enable the Purchasing Activity and vendors to 
clarify solicitation requirements. In addition, any need for 
changes in specifications or solicitation requirements may be 
addressed to facilitate a more competitive environment, meet 
industry standards, or better define state needs. 
Section 4.3, pg. 22 
West Virginia  Pre-bid Conference - A meeting between vendors and agency 
personnel which offers an opportunity to emphasize and 
clarify critical aspects of a solicitation, eliminates 
misunderstanding and permits vendor input. Vendor 
attendance may be mandatory or voluntary as specified in the 
bid document. 
West Virginia Procurement 
Handbook p. 13 
Wisconsin  Conduct and document pre-bid conference, if approved for 
use. In most instances, a pre-bid conference is not necessary. 
For more complex procurements, the pre-bid conference may 
provide an opportunity to discuss the solicitation 
requirements, including explaining complicated 
specifications, and to address any questions from potential 
bidders. Such conference is held as early as possible after the 
IFB has been issued and before bids are submitted and 
opened. It must never be used as a substitute for amending a 
defective or ambiguous specification or IFB. 
Wisconsin Invitation for Bid 
Toolkit Section 6.2 
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Wyoming Pre-bid conferences are held in cases where vendor or 
manufacturer input is desired. Invitations to attend such a 
conference are issued to prospective bidders. 
Wyoming Vendor's Guide p. 
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Figure 3-1: Conceptual Framework 
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2018 American Marketing Association Winter Educator’s Conference, New Orleans, LA. 
 
Kevin Chase and James Mead, “The Impact of Device Attachment on Consumer 
Perceptions,” 2017 Society for Marketing Advances, Louisville, KY. 
 
Kevin Chase, “The Effect of Restricted Supplier Access on Organizational Buying 
Behavior” 2017 Southeast Marketing Symposium, Lexington, KY. 
 
Kevin Chase and Brian Murtha, “Configuring Sales Encounters with Customers” 2016 
American Marketing Association Winter Educator’s Conference, Las Vegas, NV. 
 
Kevin Chase and Brian Murtha, “Configuring Sales Encounters with Customers” 2016 
Southeast Marketing Symposium, Starkville, MS. 
 
Kevin Chase and Brian Murtha, “Sales Managers and Salesperson Joint Sales Calls: When 
Should the Boss Stay Home?” 2015 Salesforce Productivity Conference, Atlanta, GA. 
 
Kevin Chase, “Sales Managers and Customer Interactions” 2015 Southeast Marketing 
Symposium, Tallahassee, FL. 
 
Kevin Chase, “The Impact of Product Eliminations on Firm Value” 2014 Southeast 
Marketing Symposium, Fayetteville, AR. 
(Bold = presenter) 
 
Teaching Interests 
Personal Selling, Sales Management, Marketing Strategy, Marketing Research  
Courses Taught    Semester          Instructor 
Rating*  
Principles of Marketing   Fall 2014             3.0/4.0  
Personal Selling    Summer 2015            3.5/4.0  
      Fall 2015             3.6/4.0 
      Spring 2017   5.0/5.0 
      Spring 2018   TBD 
*Overall Instructor Quality 
  
 
Honors and Awards 
Society for Marketing Advances Conference Best Paper Award, 2017 
Finalist for ISBM Doctoral Research Award, 2017 
Department of Marketing Outstanding Student Research Award, 2017 
AMA-Sheth Doctoral Consortium Fellow, 2016 
Department of Marketing and Supply Chain Teaching Award 2016 
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Gatton College of Business and Economics Luckett Fellowship 2015, 2016, 2017 
Gatton College of Business and Economics Fellowship Award, 2013, 2014 
Linfield College Faculty Scholarship, 2002-2006 
 
Doctoral-Level Course Work 
Marketing and Management Theory 
Consumer Behavior I    Dr. David Hardesty 
Consumer Behavior II   Dr. John Peloza 
Management Strategy    Dr. Walter Ferrier 
Marketing Strategy     Dr. Brian Murtha 
Organizational Theory   Dr. Joe Labianca 
 
Methods 
Applied Statistics (Regression)  Dr. Michael Toland 
Hierarchical Linear Modeling  Dr. Xin Ma 
Multivariate Analysis    Dr. Hongwei Yang 
Rasch Modeling    Dr. Kelly Bradley 
Research Methods    Dr. Stephen Borgatti 
Structural Equation Modeling  Dr. Hongwei Yang 
Teaching Methods in Business  Dr. Gail Hoyt 
 
ISBM Doctoral Seminars 
Personal Selling and Sales Management  Dr. Michael Ahearne 
Relationship Marketing Theory & Research  Dr. Robert Palmatier, Dr. Lisa Scheer 
 
 
 
Reviewer 
AMA Winter Educators Conference, 2018 
 Sales, Leadership, and Human Resources Track 
 Sustainability Track 
 
Society for Marketing Advances, 2017 
 Digital Marketing Track 
 
AMA Winter Educators Conference, 2017 
 Customer Relationship Management and Sales Track 
 
AMA Winter Educators Conference, 2016 
 Customer Relationship Management and Sales Track  
Marketing Strategy Track 
  
AMA Summer Educators Conference, 2016 
 Customer Relationship Management and Sales Track 
 Social Responsibility, Sustainability, & Public Policy Track 
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Service 
Kentucky Behavioral Research Lab Assistant 2013 to Present 
AACSB Accreditation Student Representative, Gatton College of Business and 
Economics, 2017 
Strategic Planning Committee, Gatton College of Business and Economics, 2014 
Budget Finance Committee, Linfield College, 2006 
 
Affiliations 
American Marketing Association  
Academy of Marketing Science 
Institute for Supply Management 
Beta Gamma Sigma Honor Society 
 
Software Programs 
SPSS, AMOS, STATA, SAS, HLM, R, Python, NVivo, Winsteps, Qualtrics, BlackBoard, 
Canvas 
 
Professional Experience 
Product Marketing Manager, Standard Financial Group, 2009-2013 
Sales and Marketing Specialist, USI Insurance Group, 2006-2009 
Field Sales Manager (sales rep), Vector Marketing, 2002-2006 
 
